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READINGS IN LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 
• CHAPTER X 
VOC/~BU L.AR I ES 
Lawyers engaged in the legislative process have a 
professional and practical interest in sociology of law and law 
and devel•::.pment. To do their jobs effectively, they must conduct 
investigations efficiently to discover what constitutes the 
difficulty, what explains the behaviour at issue, and how to 
develop a legislative programme likely to resolve the difficulty. 
These lawyeys' conceYn with behaviour focusses on what 
people do in the face of a rule of law. Before designing a law to 
solve a social difficulty, they must explain how the present law 
contributes to the difficulty, and how their proposed law will • change behaviouy to help resolve the difficulty. That calls for 
investigatic•ns about the relationship between the social 
behaviour at issue, and the law that affects it. 
Like all investigations, that calls for a ih§Q~~, for 
without a theory, the investigator does not know wh~re to look to 
find an ~nswer for the research question posed. That is, the 
researcher needs criteria for relevance -- what information will 
likely help solve the question that the research aims at, and 
what will not push that task forward. In effect, theory creates 
blinders for the investigator, to exclude irrelevant material and 
tc include· relevant material. Three sets of blinders cooperate 
towards this end: Methodology (discussed in Chapters V and VI), 
gene·,.. a 1 pe·l'"spe c t i ves, like economic or jurisprudential theory 
• 
(discussed in Chapters VII, fr_~ concepts (_,_,r VIII and IX), and the 
we use to understand events <discussed· in this 
Chapter and in Chapter X I) • they make research 
possible. Without them, like idiots counting the grains of sand 
on a beachJ we cannot even conduct a meaningful investigation. 
C.:•n cepts and the words we use have a close relationship. 
We symbolize concepts by words. To discusses concepts requires 
that we also discuss the words we use to symbolize those 
concepts, that is, our vocabulary. What set of concepts -- that 
is, what vocabulary seems most useful to guide investigations 
about what the law ought to be in conditions of development? 
Vocabularies 
words that constitute a vocabulary always are relatively general . 
• 
The researcher co nsiders these general words and then examines 
the particular set of circumstances at issue. The general words 
tell him for what sort of facts to look. For example, law and 
economics focusses on wealth-maximizing behaviour of individuals. 
It instructs the researcher that, to understand behaviour, look 
for incentives and disincentives. That constitutes an agenda for 
research. Finding what constitute s the most useful agenda for 
research a d is c i p 1 i ne c.' f law and development in China 
constitutes the subject-matter of this Chapter. 
As we suggested in the last Chapter, the concepts we use for 
investigations into what the law ought to be have a strong 
relation~hip with the perspectives that we adopt. For example, 
• 
Law and ELonomi~s resonates easily with supply-side ec.:•nomi cs. It 
constitutes not only a legal philosophy, in but (as we e)r;amine 
this Chapter), a vocabulary for investigation. 
Ju·r- isprudents have developed many vocabularies. • 
these do not bear any ~~2!i~i! relationship to a perspective on 
evolved 
c:I(?VE·lopment or econ•:•mics. M•:.st frequently, they "'*** le:rjieal without 
their a•Jthors cc•nside·r .i ng the consequences 
c.ievelc•pment. ( J•:•hn Austin, the au~hor of one historically 
important vocabulary, analytical pc•sitivism, does not seem to 
have considered important ~D~ social consequences of law!). 
In this Chapter we consider a wide variety of vocabularies 
These several vc•cabttla·ries may seem tc• •:•verlap, but in fact th~~ 
• 
• 
constitute mutually exclusive categories. 
~;,;__") 
voc:abula·ry advi:.[;;f.. A 
the investigator to look h~r~ and not ih§£§· It must therefore 
assert that the categories its concepts define constitute the 
only ones that count. If a vocabulary holds that to understand 
how law affects behaviour one need look only at category ~' then 
one need not look at other Another vocabulary may 
advise the researcher to look at category ~' but also to look at 
categories h and £• The vocabularies are inconsistent. The 
l"esearcher cannot accept both; •:•ne must make 1.1p c•ne' s mind. 
In this Chapter we examine a number candidate 
vocabularies for sociology of law and law and development. We 
remind the reader of the statement made in Chapter I: We include 
• 
contradictory theories so that readers can make up their 
minds about what suits in China. As an organizing theme, for the 
r~mainder •:•f this volume we adc•pt the instituthnalist vc.cabulary, 
·'If . 
just as we adop~ the problem-solving methodology even though we 
discussed ends-means <Chapter Vl. We neveitheless urge readers to 
examine the other vocabularies discussed, so that they can make 
their own judgments about their respective advantages and 
disadvantages in the Chinese context. 
This Chapter discusses: 
A. Introduction: The function of vocabularies in research: 
B. The Rule of Law vocabulary; analytical 
positivism. 
C. Sociological jurisprudence and legal realism • 
• E. Law and Economics. F. Marxist legal theory. 
G. Ins'. tit uti c•n<:~ 1 ism. (t' 
· V.Jh i c h of thes.e sE·veral vocabularies seems most useful to an 
~.Ji th legislation useful fo·r" 
solving China's difficulties in the closing years of the 
twentieth century? 
A. INTRODUCTION: THE FUNCTION OF VOCABULARIES IN RESEARCH 
CHAMBLISS AND SEIDMAN, LAW, ORDER AND POWER C1978l pp.55-57. 
Methodology, perspectives, vocabulary: these elements make up every social theory. 
In this chapter we discuss the various vocabularies (categories. concepts) and 
theoretical perspectives employed by social scientists, including lawyers, in an effon to 
understand and use law and the legal order. In this chapter we will also develop more 
fully the theoretical perspective which we believe to be the most useful and the mo~t 
consistent with known facts about law and society. 
The vocabulary we choose to study a phenomenon ineluctably places blinders on 
us. It must do this or else we see so much we cannot understand it. Like methodologies 
and perspectives, vocabularies guide us to relevant data. In the convenrional language 
of theory, vocabularies in general terms identify independent variables. dependent 
variables, and relevant conditions correlated with the social facts we wish to describe 
and explain. In the language of the problem-solving methodology we earlier advanced. 
proposition~ concerning categ~ri~ con~ti~te h~p.ristics useful i~] direCliog, attentioq to 
appropr1ate exp~at1on and data. 
. There is a fundanH:ntal paradox in this process ot developi~g categories and · 
perspectives. No matter how we try. we can never make our minds blank slates. To 
-:xamine requires that we use a vocabulary. To be useful a vocabulary (or categories) 
must help in explaining the phenomena under examination. We dare not use our 
• 
f 
• 
• 
• 
elo~ttng vocabulary unexamined. or else our explanations will merely reflect bur 
present biases. Before doing the research designed to explain the legal order. 
paradoxically. we must generate an explanation for it out of which to generate 
categories to guide the research. Accomplishing that becomes the principal task of the 
·'ideal-type." 
The ideal-type t:xpresses what. based on presenr knowledge. the theorist supposes 
constitute the key variables. put together in a pallern whose f(>rm derives not from 
detailed data (for gathering the data constitutes the purpose of the research). but from 
logical inferences based upon preliminary excursions into the domain of study. 
Investigators deep in their subject create the great ideal-types. such as Hans Kelsen 's 
model of the legal order. Max Weber's of bureaucracy, or Karl Marx's of capitalism. 
Such an ideal-type may. facially. prescribe a Utopia. but it may base itself explicitly or 
implicitly upon an explanation. That explanation. necessarily in general terms, 
identifies outcomes. causative factors, and conditions and specifies how these logically 
interact with each other. In law and society studies. ideal-types concern themselves 
more directly than does "grand theory" with the working of the legal order. 
Consider. for example, the vocabulary suPoested by H.L.A. Hart. 1 Hart divides 
the law into ''primary" and "secondary" ruJeJ!,lainly. that constitutes an ideal-type. 
Hart does not describe any particular state society when he discusses the character and 
function of primary and secondary rules. In his book. we find scant reference to any 
particular legal system. Hart argues, however. that to understand any particular legal 
order we must distinguish between "primary" and ··secondary" rules. By primary 
rules Han means those rules of law which are simultaneously addressed to the citizen 
and government officials (for example, the judge). A rule prohibiting the sale of heroin 
is addressed to the citizen and warns him or her that they may be punished if they 
engage in this act; this rule also tells the judge that if someone is found engaging in the 
sale of heroin the judge is to punish them. But. Hart argues, equally important for an 
understanding of the legal order are the secondary rules: these are rules addressed 
solely to the administrators of the law, a rule requ· ring that a judge conduct a trial in a 
certain fashion,.for ~x.'!mple. 
~y providing this language, these categories for inquiry into law. 
and creating this particular ideal-type Hart -is structuring our vision. He provides a set 
of categories and implicitly a theory about how law works which excludes from our 
vision a multitude of other facts and focuses our attention on those facts which he 
believes to be crucial for an understanding of the legal order. Whether or not he is 
correct in choosing the vocabulary he does. creating the ideal-type he creates, and 
implying the theory implied, will in the end be determined by the theory's ability to 
explain what actually happens and by the theory's utility in providing usable 
propositions for changing existing conditions. 
With this orientation in mind, then, let us examine a few of the most influential 
vocabularies and perspectives employed by social scientists in an effort to understand 
the legal order. It must be borne in mind, in the discussion that follows. that ideas, like 
all other social facts, exist within the constraints of a particular historical period. There 
are, of course, resources available for transcending existing knowledge. This is 
necessary for ideas to change. Nonetheless. the ability to manufacture new perspec-
tives and vocabularies is itself linked to the inherited Weltanschauung (world view) of 
a particular generation. Thus, to understand today's vocabularies and perspectives it is 
necessary to delve into the history of these ideas and see first of all what political. 
economic. and social relations existed at the time of their creation. We object as much 
as anyone to thumbnail sketches of the lifetime works of profound and sometimes 
prolific scholars-. We urge students to read the works of the authors discussed in the 
original. We recognize. however. that not everyone has time for that; so we include 
these condensations as a handy index to these writers and no more than that. 
* Prirrery rules address ordinary action. Secondary rules address 
officials. They prescribe the criteria of valid law; how to change 
law; and how to adjudicate cases arising. 
B. THE RULE OF LAW VOCABULARY, MAX WEBER, AND 
ANALYTICAL POSITIVISM 
CHAMBLISS AND SEIDMAN, Lr\vJ, ORDER AND POWER C1978) pp. 
One of the most lasting conceptions of law and the legal order is summarized under the 
concept the "Rule of Law." Scholars, lawyers. politicians, and laypersons alike have 
employed this perspective on the legal order for centuries. The ·'ideal-type·· assumed 
by this model sees the law as a set of rules, norms, and institutionalized processes 
which function to create predictable, comprehendible rules that limit the discretion of 
state officials. This perspective on the law emerged in England during those centuries 
when England's political economy was undergoing a transition from feudalism to 
capitalism. 
Late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century England saw a drama~c conflict 
between the older landed gentry and the newer entrepreneurial classes., -pe former 
struggling to maintain its hold on state power, the latter trying to dislodge it. At stake 
lay command over the English economy and the use of state power to bolster directly 
and indirectly the one class or the other. 
The English common law courts developed out of the continuing struggle between 
the Crown and the great feudatories. Under feudal constitutional law, a feudatory had 
in effect his own government and his own courts; the power to govern came with the 
land. The Crown early tried to eat away that jurisdiction by sending the king's judges 
into the countryside to try cases on a winner-takes-all basis. The substantive law they 
applied purported to arise from custom, not from the Crown's will. For example. while 
primogeniture (inheritance of property by the eldest son) prevailed for distributing a 
dead person's estate, in those parts of England that followed the custom called 
gavelkind, courts distributed property equally to the deceased's children. The judges 
purported to apply not laws that they invented, but only customary norms. As a body of 
decisions accumulated, judges came to follow not the statements of witnesses about the 
content of the custom, but what the earlier, precedent cases declared it to be. Even 
legislation at first took its force from the claim that it only embodied custom. as the 
rules concerning the overseas reach of British law demonstrates. 
English law declared that Englishmen colonizing overseas-for Britain. the 
world's greatest empire, an important occupation--<:arried their law with them as a 
• 
57·-62. 
• 
:hrighl. That law .• o ever. did not include a/lthe law ot England. bt!l only part ot 
the common law all statutes in affirmance of the common law passed in 
gland, antec_tdent A _ e settlement of a colony .... • •2 
• • e ~urts that decide cases by "applying" 
!S must in some cases create law. Some fact situations fall clearly either within or 
hout a rule. Some. however. fall within the rule's gray areas. in which reasonable 
·yers disagree about whether the rule properly subsumes the facts. In deciding 
ether the rule does or does not control the case, the court in effect must rewrite the 
:, expanding it a bit to include the troublesome facts within its embrace, or 
,rracting it to exclude them. To that extent, courts inevitably make new law. 
In undertaking this task. the common-law judges wavered between two alternative 
xies. On the one hand. the common-law judges (at least until the middle of the 
~teenth century) perceived themselves in the aristocratic tradition. The common 
. they said, resided in their breasts; they announced it from time to time and usually 
Je few hones about their creative role. On the other, they sometimes denied that 
v created law. Purporting to enforce custom, they readily attributed any change in 
law to the slow transformation of social values and standards. To warrant the title of 
lllm. a norm must embody the custom of "all-of-us." In common-law theory, 
tom and law become the resultant of community determination. It assumed that a 
iety had a common set of values, manifested in its common choice of norms. It 
~·eivcd law not as the molder of society or creator of institutions, but as a newly 
itutionalized form of norms earlier developed in society's bosom. 
The notion that courts did not create norms, but merely enforced "the custom of 
realm·· conformed nicely to the emerging theme of contract as the principal form of 
nomi~.: cooperation. In feudal England, economic cooperation rested upon custom-
institutions. upheld by state power. The serf had certain obligations to the owner of 
manor: the vassal, to his lord. These obligations ensured that the economy would 
~.:tion and extract the surplus for the benefit of the feudatories. They ensured that the 
t~ would perform the labor upon which the whole edifice rested. Other norms give 
serf rights required to ensure that the labor force would reproduce itself. For 
1mple. the serf had certain customary rights to land and the right to physical 
•teet ion against marauders. 
In the sixteenth century, feudalism was in rapid decline. The mercantilist theory 
rapidly coming to dominate political and economic thought and practice: 
_. ~krcantili~ts aimed at amassing in their own country the greatest possible amount of 
1'un:. To this end Navigation Acts a !tempted to confine trade to English ships so that the navy 
dd h~ k~pt strong. Bounties were paid to exporters of corn since com exports were held to 
ouragc Jgri.:ulture and to bring in treasure and home industries were protected with tariffs. 
' "as the theory helc..;-y the Government and the bourgeoisie in England right up to the 
u'triJI Revolution.' 
the eighteenth century. English feudalism had long since died. Britain lay gripped 
a mercantilist ewnomy and an aristocratic constitution. State power supported and 
creatcu au ~~·muuay '" ., ...... 1·· · ·--c- . 
• 
served the interests of the landed gentry, who governed the l·nuntry·c· • · as JUsti~.:es of 
the peace and controlled the tight London circles of Parliament wernment. 
Meanwhile, in the very heart of mercantilism. new fmms nf ·rprisc arose. 
British and Scotch mechanics began the spate of invention that created the lnuu~trial 
Revolution. New people, both.canny and daring. saw vast oppnrtunities fur profits 111 
manufacturing and selling goods. In an unplanned econ,lmy. commodity exd1an~.: 
rests upon each economic actress trying to seit.e her ch;IIKC as she· percL·ives it 
Contracts replaced feudal custom as the economy's glue. Employers hired employee!>: 
importers sold to wholesalers. wholesalers to retailers. retailers to o.:onsum~.:rs. supplier' 
to manufacturers. Entrepreneurs entered upon large undertakings with one an11thcr. 
based upon their agreement to cooperate in specified ways. 
Contract became the legal form of a free-market economy. MerL·antilism deni.:d 
the free market. The form of law associated with mercantilism made contrac-t bw-tlll' 
law of the free market-difficult. The privilege-ridden mercantilist legal .1rda1r mad!.! it 
difficult to estimate how courts and the state would deal with investment. L:llntran'. 
and property-and above all else, businesswomen must calculate what might hapr ·n to 
their enterprise. 
New philosophies arose to express the world views of the new free-nnrket 
economy entrepreneurs. In economics, Adam Smith explained the relative wealth of 
nations (why some nations were rich and others poor) by the free market: those nations 
with free-market economies encouraged invention and productivity. those with other 
economic forms discouraged these developments.4 It followed therefore that England 
was by rights wealthy and Asia poor, for example. In philosophy. jurisprudence. and 
law, Jeremy Bentham created a theoretical perspective that resonated easily with Adam 
Smith's daring new notions of the value of laissez-faire capitalism. Bentham argued 
that people were motivated by an overwhelming concern to maximize pleasure and 
minimize pain. In law these ideas translated into a utilitarian philosophy in which the 
state's responsibility was to see that undesirable behavior was swiftly. ~.:crtainly. and 
severely punished while desirable behavior was rewarded by the acqubition of m: 
wealth.~ These new social theories implied a legal order that llKated ewno ... 
decisions in the heads of entrepreneurs. Contract law embodied its typical modalit:. 
Contracts embody the operative norms of capitalist econumi~.: life. from tht.' Ia" 
businessmen demanded the exclusi~~ 1?9~ctr 19 determine those nnrms ;llld the Ia" 's 
subsequent aid in enforcing them. t' • • • · 
That called for a legal order whose courts served mainly to dcL·iclc 
conflicts over the performance of bargains, in which entrepreneurs (or their lawyers f"r 
them) could predict the decision with reasonable certainty. To do that. :1 wurt had to 
treat those who appeared before it as formally equal. for it would not serve the cause ,,t 
predictability if the well-born copld expect the court's favor for no heth.:r reas110 than 
the blueness of their blood. A court had to decide pursuant to rules wdl known in 
advance. without the intrusion of the judge's personal values: it would 1111t do to maJ..c 
every case depend upon what the particular judge ale for breakfasl. A court hau to 
require government officials. too, to act on.ly pursuant to ruks that mauc their hchaviur ,
.. 'f•.,.,., .• • .• ..._....,_.,.~ .... ,, :::-··r ...... •• . ..._ ............... , • ·r ... ,: 
predictablo! . The capitalist dreamed of a static legal world . whose eouns decided cases 
like computers. and legislation had no role . In one of the several ideologies of the 
common Jaw, the bourgeois jurisprudents found a congenial set of norn1s prescribing 
how courts ought to behave . In laissez-fa ire ideologies of the Jaw, the common-Jaw 
courts became the very core of the legal order. 
Nowadays we call such a legal or.der the "rule of law. " The rule of law arose out 
of the demands of the new entrepreneurial Classes for a form of state power 
commensurate with Jai ssez-faire that would so far as possible endow them with power 
and that would discipline b~reaucrats not to interfere with that power. All the usual 
attributes of the rule of Jaw resonate with that concep_!iO!), e.g. , judicial independence. 
narro"· discn:tion. equality before the Jaw. due process, and judicial review of 
Jdministrative action . · 
So stated, the ideologY, of the rule of Jaw constitutes a nonnative model, a 
a:ttemenr. not of how things are, but of how they ought to be . Such ideologies easily 
·all prey to the nonnative fallacy. the belief that they describe how things actually are . 
)o with the rule of Jaw: many people fondly believe that we have a society in which the 
·ule of law operates . with at best minor aberrations . Whether the rule of law actually 
kscribes the legal order. or whether it in fact mystifies it and why, becomes a central 
~s ue for an adequate study of Jaw and society . 
The rule of law, moreover. readily fits a consensus model. That model argues that 
·very society has a panicular set of values, upon which practically all its members 
gree . If p.:ople do share basic values, then a democratic state must represent that 
onsensu s. The only legal problem becomes one of ensuring that individuals do not 
ubstitute their own deviant motivations for the values of the polity . A common variant 
,f the consensus perspective holds that. although the polity of course contains conflict, 
h~J,!!~tsc:lf does not take sides. No matter how antagonistic the contending classes 
•r ~'7 on this much they must agree, that the peaceful settlement of conflict serves 
11-of-us better than violence. In this view, the state represents all -of-us, but only for 
he limited purpose of containing conflict. Every specific law or activity of the state 
arries its burden of values, but the machinery by which the state comes to the decision 
o create and enforce any panicular law operates impanially . 
The rule of law theory par excellence embodies this variant of the consensus 
nodcl . Its strictures aim at ensuring the value-neutrality of the state machinery . Under 
1 ~ value-neutral state's benign aegis, people (read entrepreneurs) can work out their 
.wn destiny. permitting the invisible hand of the market to determine the best 
I location of goods and services, made possible by the perfect predictability ensured by 
1e value-neutral state and the rule of Jaw. 
In jurisprudence, the dominant school in this lradition became that of analytical 
os itivism; in sociology, that of Max Weber. Here we discuss Weber's theory of law. 
lnh•ersalistic Rules, Autonomous Legal System, and Legalistic Reasoning 
lax Weber wanted to explain why industrial capitalism arose in the West, but not 
lscwhere. He sought to relate· his concept of the un ique charac teristics of western 
~ 
European Jaw to the rise of nineteenth-century capitali sm .h A ~ystem whe re pmtit 
maximization makes each the other 's enemy seems oppo~cd to tec hnological demand~ 
for cooperation . Exchange through markets resolve~ thi s 11.: nsi1)n. Every bargain 
accommodates these two disparate forces . From the actor's poi nt of vie w the exchange 
brings control over resources . If a party withdraws fro m a barga in it loses its purpose . 
Custom loses power and cannot ensure the calculability demanded by mcxlt:rn 
entrepreneurs. A legal order becomes necessary to enfo n:e agreed-upon bargains. Th a( 
legal order rests upon three pillars: an autonomous legal system , universalistic rub . 
and legalistic reasoning . The very notion of a market economy . open to every person, 
requires sanctions pursuant to universalistic rules that apply to all similar transac tions. 
Market bargains define the nonns of economic interchange, within the framework of 
the general rules of property, ton, and criminal law. Courts sanction violations of these 
rules. Calculability requires a system where each actor can discover what Jaw will 
apply in a particular situation. He can discover such rules only under publicly known 
procedures for detennining the law, adhered to by judges who exercise little di~cretion . 
That condition presupposes that judges (and lawyers) can find the rules by logical 
processes-that is, that the Jaw exists as a "seamless web " and that if gap~ seem tn 
exist, sources within the legal order can llll them. This system nf Jaw-finding we ~:all 
"legalistic." Its great expression in the English jurisprudence became analytical 
positivism. 
Weber thus defined the ideal-type of capitalistic Jaw . In Weber's view , "legalism 
supponed the development of capitalism by providing a stable and predictable: 
atmosphere; capitalism encouraged legalism because the bourgeoisie were aware 1lf 
their own need for this type of governmental structure . " 7 How well do its categoril!s 
serve to study law and society in our century? 
• • • • [T)ne concept of universalistic rules requires that we ignore most· .~ !' 
the law of social administration in favor of lawyers ' law . That entails a value-judgment 
in favor of those solutions which lawyers' Jaw serves-i .e. , solutions consistent with 
an extreme version of laissez-faire. No government in the real world accepts so narrow 
a limitation upon its powers . If we want to study what governments in fact do, we must 
adopt categories adapted to studying not only lawyers' law, but also the Jaw of social 
administration . As a category, universalistic rules read too narrowly . 
Legalistic reasoning as a category of study too cannot serve , but for anothl!r 
reason: it does not exist any place except in some jurisprudents' heaven . Judges cannot 
l;lecide "trouble" cases solely with materials drawn from the universe of norms . The 
law is not a gapless web.1 
• 
NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
the development of sociology of More than any other 
individ•..tal, he began systematic theorizing about thr-:? 
relationships between law and The ca teg•::.r ies he 
developed, however, arose primarily out of his study of the great 
transition from pre-capitalist to capitalist Europe. 
useful are they to help investigations into problem,s of law and 
development in 20th ~entury China? 
For example, in 1979 China enacted an anti-pollution law. 
Anyone who has walked through the streets of Beijing in midwinter 
knows that the law has not accomplished spectacular successes in 
• 
removing pollutants from Beijing's atmosphere Cby some measures, 
Beijing has the most polluted atmosphere of any major city in the 
world). 
How would Weber's categories guide an investigation to 
explain the relative failure of China's anti-pollution law? That 
law constitutes a law of social administration. Weber's model 
suggests that a law's failure to induce conforming behaviour 
results from insufficient autonomy of the legal system, or a rule 
insufficiently universalistic, or legal reasoning.insufficiently 
legalistic. He argued that legal rationality worked best when 
both monopoly power and social interests were weak. Rational 
legality was undermined by particularistic demands characteristic 
• 
governments in societies where one 
class possessed a virtual power. A rule permitting 
its addressees great discretion in deciding how to obey does not 
-~&' 
t t t t. , , f u n i ·;E.' r ,.;. a 1 i :::. t i c: rules, bc,_:.3use it in fact 
• ,::tction a p p 1 i c.:<. b 1 e t •::• 
1 • •, f.' ' 1 · (• ( lt? e Cj I I a 1 1 Y J but a delegation of power to the authority 
little ·rc::?gard for the rule. Because of the 
·~·e.:d .. enfc··r cement mechanisms fot· China's anti-pollution rule, in 
fact everyone has discretion, to obey or not t.:• obey. A system 
that permits great discretion fails because it does not meet the 
criterion of univesalistic rules . 
Weber's . lack _J.nterest, 
~ ~j_<j ( ·~ T-, .)' but it 
China's anti-pollution laws -- that 
they should be strictly enforced so as to reduce de facto 
discretion to obey -- only restates the problem to be solved, 
to· enforce China's anti-pollution laws. In any 
event, a multitude of factoYs, not merely the rules, autonomy, 
• and legalistic reasoning affect behaviour in the face of a Yule 
of law. The e:v.planation fo:•·r the legal order's behaviour cannot 
1 ie in the rules themselves, but must lie in the 
interweaving of ·r u 1 es and those other factors. Because Weber's 
categories point us away from behaviour to the texts of positive 
laws, they cannot serve to solve existential problems in law and 
society. That domain requires us to cc•n:.ider constantly the 
tension between the law-in-the-books and the law-in-action. With 
their emphasis on legalism, Weber's categorie:. point us away from 
the law-in-action. 
Lik_e the i"ule of law model generally, Weber's categories 
impose a strong ideological bias •.tpon law and society 
• investigations. Those categories impose a pre-cut pattern upon 
• 
• 
• 
~~ 
~j 
the range of potential explanations and hence of potential 
solutions. They require us to ask only the narrow question: what 
will serve to develop 0r strengthen a legal order appropriate to 
a market-oriented, privately-controlled, laissez-faire economy? 
For that Law and Economics does a far more sophisticated job. At 
any rate, Weber's categories have too narrow a focus to study the 
law in the context of today's world 
multinational corporations, state 
administration • 
-~ WI monopoly capitalism, 
corporations and social 
The Rule of Law vocabulary • 
resonates easily with analytical jurisprudence. That philosophy 
had as its principal founder John Austin, who worked in the 
fourth and fifth decade of the nineteenth century. (See above, 
Chapter Il. He stated the essence of analytical positivism in its 
central dictum: law is the command of the sovereign. That tells 
the lawyer to go to the library and read the law-in-the-books, 
because those laws embody the sovereign's command. 
Sociology of law and law and development stand in flat 
contradiction to that viewpoint. To understand how law works in 
the wc•rld c•u tside •:•f libraries, one must leave the library to 
e:,;amine the wo·rld "out there". Does the Rule of La•,..o vocabulary 
and analy·tical p•::.sitivism have any meaning ·for the lawyer engaged • 
in legislati<:<n? 
Analytical positivism shouts at us its central teaching: 
Only the words of the rules have any importance. The 1 awye·r, the 
policeman, the bureaucrat and the judge must cc•nform their 
behaviour to the commands of the sovereign, and that they learn 
from the words, that is, from the law-in-the-books. If an 
official or a judge cannot learn the command from the words alone 
(as constrtled by a legal technique that looks exclusively at the 
law-in-the-books) then too easily the official will enforce not 
the sovereign's cc•mmands, but the personal dicates of the 
official. or judge or so analytical positivism implies. That 
hardly helps the drafter, whc. must himself cc•mpose the "command 
of the s•:•vereign" when he writes the laws. It does, hc.wever, 
., 
• 
• 
• 
contain an important message: The paY"ticulaY" • ... •o·r'"ds 
~~­
( ;.~,) 
used i'rT-"'a 
WY"itten law (including subsidiary legislation, regulations and so 
have deep significance. They constitute the means by 
which the law-maker conveys to others in the state structure and 
to individuals the desired noY"ms of behaviour. Unless the laws' 
addressees understand the ,....,o·rds and try to obey them, the 
enteY"prise of governance through rules -- that is, the enterprise 
of gove·rnment itself -- must fail. (Compare Professor Singer's 
legal nihilism, Chapter Ill. 
Words surely do not constitute little crystals, with a hard 
surface seperating the matters covered by the words from all 
o:•thers. At the edges, all words <1> become fuzzy and unclear.<2> 
Nevertheless, the enterprise of law requires that in the first 
instance we respect the w•:•rds of the laws. All laws delegate 
power to implementing officials for a purpose defined by the 
legislature. In a democratic society, the rule by the people has 
significance only if the officials ca·r-ry out the will 
legislature. In the first instance, the legislature expresses its 
will in the words it uses. Before construing a statute in terms 
of po 1 icy, therefore, we must try to construe it in terms of 
words. Only if that enterprise proves impossible ought we 
consider extraheous matter~. Before writing a statute, therefore, 
of course we must understand its policy and purposes. We must 
always remember, however, that o:our task lies in conveying the 
1 Excep~ proper names . 
2 As we have seen, the legal nihilists argue from this that 
therefore no law has any ascertainable meaning. Se~above, 
Chapter- I I ( concer·ning lr\-,:,fessot- Singe·!'"' s claims.). 
k_ 
.i n t en t .i •=• n add ·r" e~3':5ef?S in ',.J()"(" d s that they 
rfl'.f) c~ 
understand. The only "intention of the legislature" that counts 
is the intention that finds expression in words. 
that constitutes the great teaching of analytical positivism. 
C. SOCIOLOGICAL JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL REALISM 
clearly than any other preceding legal philosophy, 
leagl real ism sto•:•d in sharp contradiction tc• analytical 
positivism. Legal realism asserted the need to study the 
difference between the rules and the behaviour they prescribed, 
and the behaviour that actually occurred in the face of the 
rules, what the Realists called the law-in-the-books and the law-
in-action. A number of legal philosophies, some (like Marxism) 
arising much earlier than legal ·realism, most (like Law and 
Economics) arising much later, agreed with that central thesis. 
They all agreed (in effect) with the proposition that emerges 
study of the Law of Non-Transferability of Law and the 
Law of Reproduction of Institutions (Chapter IV): In deciding how 
to behave in the face of a rule of law, people determine their 
behaviour in light the rule and the threat of 
sanction, but all the other constraints and resources in their 
social and physical env i r•:•nment. In this section, we e:r;amine 
sr::• c i r::•l r::• g i c a 1 jur~sprudence and legal realism. We then examine 
various theories that accept the central legal realist 
propositi?n, but _differ about the variables that a theory must 
c:ons.ide·r to e:t;amine behaviour in the face of a rule .:,f la¥J:· In 
S~?ction D, theot·ies that focus on subjective factors (the 
• 
• 
•
\' 1• · t c•_tc::_-.t·-·n·.·, t~-.e le·g=-1 c•-tlt•_tr·e.·l ·, 
·,'0 r::s.ge~S . ; ~ I ~· in E, 
-:k Vs) 
law and 
·' 
• 
• 
economics; in Section F, Marxist legal theory; and in Section G, 
institutinnalism. 
CHAMBLISS AND SEID~~' LAW, ORDER AND POWER (Supra) 
~.2 THE FAILURE OF THE RULE OF LAW THEORY 
Eighte<!nth-c<!ntury thinkers ··worked on a series of assumptions: that a society such as· 
th..: Am..:rican and its form of government by the state were bound together inseparably:' 
that both could be made more perfect-and hence that the progress of society and' 
progress of the state were o~e and the same. Eighteenth century optimism was based on 
legislative reform. conscious political judgement and action. Revolution was the 
savant of the legislature and the legislature was the servant of the people. "9 
The nineteenth and twentieth centuries overwhelmed that sanguine temper. The 
world created by the ~e of capitalism and the Industrial Revolution defied control. The 
government promised to be structured in the interests of the people but developed 
instead large-scale organization, bureaucracy. and bases of decision-making that 
contradicted and undermined the lofty ideals and theories that justified their existence. 
The early nineteenth century found people revolting against the prevailing order. 
demanding political rights. and struggling to expand liberal democracy. The "Rule of 
Law" theory was shaken by the onslaught of people ·s actions expressing and 
illuminating the contradictions that existed between the ideal of law and society and the 
reality of most people's experiences. 
A variety of theories of law and -~~~~~y a~~e to explain the failure. 
Eugene Ehrlich 1 1862-1922) lived in the Duchy of Bukovina, which was then part of 
the- Austro- Hungarian Em pin:. Bukovina was the home of at least nine distinct ethnic : 
and religious groups. Each had its own informal rules: for marriage and divorce. 
descent and distribution. landlord and tenant. They followed these norms. not the · 
formal Civil Code. Ehrlich called these informal norms the "living law" in contrast to 
the formal legal order. He argued that the living law should rank the priorities of 
payment of the various claims and demands different people and groups made upon the 
law: 
When the jurist is asked to draw the line between the conflicting interests independently. he is 
:1sked by implication. to do it according to justice .... The catch phrase about balancing of 
intcre~ts that is so successful at the present time is not an answer to this question. for the very 
question is: What is it that gives weight to the interests that are to be balanced? Manifestly it is 
not the balancing jurist. writer or teacher. Judge or legislator. but society itself .... Justice 
th!(refore does not proceed from the individual, but arises in society. H 
In short the legislator or jurist should adjust the formal law to match the living law. 
The sociological school. in the wing represented by Ehrlich, ultimately asserted 
not m_erely that formal taw reinstitutionalized custom, but that it ought to do so. It 
contributed to ~tudying law as social engineering by distinguishing the living law from 
the formal law-a lead that the legal realists, coming from a different, positivist 
tradition. would follow. 
While the sociological school began to explore the tensions between formal law 
and living law. the re~l_i~ts i_n_~h~. ~nited States moved rapidly in the same direction. As 
noted earlier Oltver wenaell Holmes fired the opening gun in the long engagement 
between th..: ;ealists and the analytical positivists in a lecture at Harvard in 1881. "The 
life of the law.·· he said, ''is not logic, the life of the law is experience.· '34 He accepted 
the positivist view of law as a human affair, decided by human beings. He added the 
pragmatic notion that one ought to b<ISe the decision on what the law ought fl) 11..: up. >n 
considerations of community expediency. 
The realists began, as did the positivists. by considering primarily what happened 
in courts. They learned that one could not explain the decision of courts in ''difticull· · 
cases, that is. those of first impression. by the elegant rationalizations that the judge~. 
following analytical positivism, gave in their opinions. They e.'<plained what judges diJ 
and ought to do: to formulate new rule's in light of how they thought the rule would 
operate in society. That is to say. they invoked the categories they called the 
law-in-the-books and the law-in-action. 
These categories, formal and living law. law-in-the-books and law-in-adi•m. 
plainly become the basic building blocks for any science of Jaw as social engineering. 
Law as social engineering supposes the use of law to influence behavior directly. The 
lawmaker can only change the formal rules. Lawmakers cannot, however. punch and 
pinch people and society like balls of clay. Unless they are quite mad. they will try t•' 
shape a legal order that effectively induces desired behavior. The way formal law in 
fact affects social behavior embodies the influence of the formal law on a society. T!Jt: 
way social behavior constrains the choice of lawmakers expresses the inftuen4.·e of the" 
living law on the formal law. The study of.formallaw and living law. of lal.l.-in-thl·-
books and law-in-action. embodies the study of the interaction-the dialectic. 1f you 
please-between law and society. 
The gap between the formal and the living law only opens up the problem. The 
study and explanation of that gap can lead to reliable knowledge about why .;orne laws 
work and others do not. Without that knowledge. society can never purposively snh-c 
its troubles. 
The realist perspective poses problems; it does not help much with solutions_ 
J+ .. marks the begmmng of wisdom ab~ut the 
problem, for it asks the right questions.· ft tells us nothing about how to go about 
answering the questions posed. 
The study of the gap between the law-in-the-books and the law-in-action too easily 
leads to research that serves merely as a handmaiden to power. If research explains 
only why people disobey, its findings will more likely teach how to induce obedience 
and not question policy itself. The study of the gap between the law-in-the-books and 
the law-in-action sometimes seduces the researcher into studying threats to power. not 
poverty and oppression. Students of law and society ought not become hired guns. 
ready to travel on demand. 
The perception of the gap between the law-in-the-books and the law-in-actiPn. 
however, initiates the generation of reliable knowledge about the limits of !Jw_ But. it 
is only a first step. That study requires a methodology which lends itself to studying 
ends as well as means. the morality as well as the practicality of the legal order_ 
• 
• 
• 
• 
QUESTION 
Ho•,.; u·:;eful the realist vocabulary as a guide to what the 
l ::\ 1r} 01.1.<;_~ht t(.l might a drafter usc it to rewrite and 
improve the anti-pollution law? 
D. "SOCIOLOGICAL" MODELS: THE VOLKGEIST· CUSTOM AND _________ , 
LAW: THE LEGAL CULTURE. 
CHAMBLISS·· AND SEIDMAN 1 LAW 1 • ORDER AND POWER (Supra) 
A variety of theories hold that society itself detennines law. These mainly rest upon 
notions of value-consensus. Here we discuss the historical school. the notion that law 
merely institutionalizes custom, and the concept of the legal culture. 
Carl von Savigny developed a jurisprudence that applied mystical Hegelian 
notions to the problem of law. He held that ·'in the general consciousness of the peopl.: 
lives positive law .... It is by no means to be thought that it was the particular 
members of the people by whose arbitrary will law was brought forth .... Rather it is 
the spirit of a people living and working in common in all the individuals. which gav.: 
birth to positive law. which therefore is to the consciousness of each individu'al not 
accidentally but necessarily one and the same.· '10 
Some sociologists took over a central notion of historical jurisprudence. William 
Graham Sumner put it in an extreme fonn: stateways cannot change folkways. 11 Law 
. reflects custom, or it remains immured in the books. Paul Bohannan stated the claim in 
a sophisticated fonn: 
Customs are norms or rules ... about the ways in which people must behave if social institutions 
are to perform their tasks and society is to endure .... Some customs in some socictie~ an: 
reinstitutionalized at another level; they are restated for the more precise purposes of legal 
institutions .... 
A legal right {and. with it, a law) is the restatement for the purpose of maintaining peaceful 
and just operation of the institutions of society. of some, but never all. of the recognized claims 
of the persons within those institutions .... 
Law is never a mere reftection of custom. however. Rather law is always out of pha'.: with 
society, specifically because of the duality of the statement and restatement and of right~.•: 
Lawrence Friedman proposed that the legal system comprises three elements: struc-
tural, substantive, and cultural. 13 Structure includes "the number and types of courts. 
presence or absence of a constitution, presence or absence of federalism or pluralism. 
division of powers between Judges, legislators, Governors, Kings, juries, administra-
tive officers; modes of procedure in various institutions and the like. " 14 
The substantive component embodies the output side of the legal system: "the 
'laws· themselves-the rules, doctrines, statutes and decrees. to the extent that they are 
acwally used by the rulers and the ruled. and in addition, all other rules which govern. 
whatever their formal status" (emphasis added). "The legal culture "-the cultural 
element~onsist~ of "the values and attitudes which bind the system together. and 
which determine the place of the legal system in the culture as a whole .... (It is] the 
term we apply to those values and attitudes which determine what structures are used 
anJ why: which rules work and which do not and why" (emphasis added). 15 
In sum. Friedman translated the term ·'legal system·· into the concept of society 
itself. consisting of the state. the society's nonnative structure. and its values and 
attitudes. But he built into his definition an explanation of how the legal system affects 
behavior: "'values and attitudes .. determine behavior. 
•• 0 ~ · Despite minor variations. these three theories explain behavio~ with respect to the 
legal order by dark. irrational, subjective attitudes of mind-the Volksgeist, custom, or 
the ··Jegal culture." All would explain the failure of law to have the effect anticipated 
in similar ways. Laws that fail "run against the grain."' 
•• 
• 
• \ 
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von.Savigny, Sumner, Bohannan 
(ti) 
and Friedman each 
NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
explain the relative failure of China's anti-pollution law? 
2. Ht:•'..J valid is the proposition that values and attitudes 
£QD~~gl behaviour? Or does behaviour in time determine values and 
attitudes·? Or is the relationship more complex? E.A.Hoebel 
among constraints and resources thrown up by our social and 
physical environment in light of our values and attitudes as they 
As we behave according to that choice, •:•u·l'" values 
and attitudes change, so that in time our values and attitudes 
conform to our behaviour .••• and so on, indefinitely. 
.-, 
L • In any event, does the statement, "an acto·r's values and 
• attitudes e:r;plains the acto:··r's behavio:•ur", have any real content·? 
Usually, how do we know that the actor has particular values and 
attitudes? t.<Je cannot believe merely what the actor says -- we 
all kn6w that severe contradictions appear between o:•ne' s 
statement of one's values, and hQW one actually behaves. ("Do not 
trust what they say, but o:•nly what they do," or "Even criminals 
sometimes go to church''). Even for those whQ believe that values 
determine behaviour, the only reliable data upon which to base a 
decision about a person's values become the behaviour itself. 
That becomes circuiar, for the difficulty to be 
e:,;plained is that ve·l'"y behaviour. One CQuld not "e:,;plain" the 
continued polluti•:•n in China's cities by a cultural "val•.1e" 
attached to either the pollution or the behaviour 
.:for the-:> best evidence of that so-called "value" 
that causes it, 
consists of the 
1<~ 
ver·y b(:o>havir:.ur that requ.i;-·es explanation. (2~ 
Nor does the circularity d~Sappear when we choose to phrase 
the problem as using values to predict how a person will behave 
in the futur-e for example, in r~sponse to a new rule of law. 
From past behaviour we infer values and attitudes; from values 
and attitudes we make a prediction of how the actor will behave 
in the fut.u·re. That amounts to no more than an extrapolation 
from past behaviour: Because the actor behaved this way in the 
past, likely the actor will continue to behave that way in 
future. The inference to values and attitudes, and then using 
those inferred values and attitudes to predict future behaviour 
adds no additional weight of probability to the extrapolation. 
Extrapolation from past behaviour to predict future behaviour is 
a risky business. (A chicken may extrapc•late frc•m the past that • 
whenever the sun rises, the farmer will feed it as 
surely as the sun rises. The chicken does not have an 
opportunity to rethink that extrapolation when one day the farmer 
wrings its neck). Applied to the Chinese anti-pollution law, a 
prediction that the Chinese "values and attitudes" •..;could p·revent 
them from observing the anti-pollution law amounted only to a 
prediction that because in the past urban Chinese had acted in 
ways that polluted the air, they would continue to do so in the 
face of the law i.e. , a simple exprapolation from past 
behaviour. 
4. Many writers attribute Chinese behaviour in the face of a 
t.:.:. "values and attitudes" -- in the hands of scholars, this 
tends to become "the legal culture". For e::;ample, in 1'388, a 
~ 
---
• 
in Cangna County in Zhejiang Province sued 
--- I c::;; 
a 1 o ca 1 
magistrate in a case arising when the local government demolished 
his house because, they claimed, it had been built illegally on 
an embankment that protected a wide area from flooding. The 
newspaper article (China Daily, September 2, 1 '388, p. 4) •..Jrote 
that "The emergence of the case is a challenge to the feudalistic 
way of life, because under the old way common people never sued 
government officials. II It qt1oted the sued magistrate: "~It 
is a good phenomenon that, with the development of a commodity 
farmers have begun to discard their old ideas and 
protect their legal rights and interests through the law instead 
of unreasonable ways like violent fighting between family 
• 
clans.'" Query: Is that an adequate explanation of why in the 
past farmers did not sue officials? Are ther~ other reasons that 
might explain the Chinese reluctance to sue officials -- for 
e~,;ampl e, an expect~tion that officials will retaliate against 
ordinary citizens who dare to sue them? Or an understanding that 
the court system in the past has been biassed against the citizen 
in favour of the official? Or ignorance of the rights granted by 
the law? Or an expectation that because of the excessive costs of 
litigation, a formal court victory still leaves the plaintiff 
impoverished? What other possible explanations can you suggest 
besides "values and attit•.ldes"? 
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~:Cl·L-\,.:zD A. ?OS:-lER, 7HE ::cc~O~ICS OF _;:_:s::,:::: 
(CA.'1.BRIJGE: H.UV. C.?., L98l) ?P· :..-2. 
Thi$ book. rake~ an economi£ approach to issues-including the 
meaning of justice, the origin of the slate, primitive law, retribu-
tion. the righ~ of privacy, defamation, racial discrimination, and 
affirrnaEive-· action-that are not generally considered e1:o-
nomic. Is not economics the study of the economic system. the 
study of markets? None of the concepts or activities in my list 
are market concepts or acti..,;ties. 
Although the traditional subject of economics is indeed the 
behavior of individuals and organizations in market.s, a mo-
ment's reflection on the economist's basic analytical tool for 
studying markets will suggest :he possibility of using ~conomics 
more broadly. That tool is ~he assumption that people are ratio-
nal ma.ximizers of their satisfactions. The principles of econom-
ics are deductions from ~hi,s. assumption-for ex::mple. the 
principle that a change in ?r:ce will affe1:t the quanti:·· of a gocd 
by affecting the attr.J.c-..i...-~ess of substitute goods, or that re-
sources will gr.r.-icate to their most remunerative uses, or that 
the individual will J.llocue his budget among available goods 
and services so that the marginal (last) dollar spent on each 
good and service-yields the s.--:rr::e·satisfaction to nim; :r it di~ not. 
he could increase his agg. e-pte utility or welfare by :-. r~a!lOGl­
uon. 
Is it plausible to s:Jppose that people are rational onlv or 
mainly when they are tr.J.nsacting in r:narkets, and not when ;.hey 
are engaged in other activities of life, such as marriage and liti-
gation and crime and di.s.c:rii:::cination and conceJ.lrnent of per-
sonal informacion? Or t.har only- the inhabitants of modern 
Western·(or Westc:Tni.zed) societic:3 are r;ational? If rationality u 
not confined to explicit market tran.:sactions but u a general and 
dominant characteristic of social behavior, then the conceptual 
apparatus constructed by generations of econornucs to explain 
market behavior can be used to explain nonmarket behavior as 
welL 
• 
• 
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The Intellectual Foundations 
''La\v and Economics'' 
Edmund-W. Kitch 
33 J. Legal Educ. (1983) 
. . · . PP. 184-96 
Tht> pnnc1pal mtelleclUal foundation of ··taw and t'conomics" has been its 
relative success in .illuminating two fundamemal questions: First, what 
eHects do lt'gal rules have upon society? And second. how do social forces 
~hape and dete_rmine the law? Law and eronomtcs has enjoyed relativelv 
greater ~uccess 10 addressing these question~ in a provocative and illumina;. 
mg manner than have other approaches to the studv o£ the phenomenon of 
law. .. • • • • 
I. Analytic ~lethods 
The major analytic methods associated \"ith law and economics are: 
\.The ~uhject to be slUdied is to be conceiH·d o£ ;b a ~\"~tt'm of constraints 
and rewards imeracting with individuals .. \ central objectin· o£ law-and· 
economics -;cholarship has been to analyze the interactiOn Ot'tween a system 
of rules and the behavior of individuals in order to determine the dfects of 
the rules. This conception of the agenda of legal scholarship was at the heart 
of legal realism. but economics. with its de\·elt>ped methods for thinking 
about the interaction between costs. rewrns. and individual protit-maximiz.· 
ing. pro\·ided an elegant analvtic framework ;1daptahle to this inquiry.
1 
2. The purpose o( -;cientific :tnalv~i~ is to identifv the svstematic 
component of phenomt'na and -;eparate thal component from the random 
phenomena . .-\ gent'raliz:Hion is usd ul :.llld worthwhile t:' en i ( it Lan expbi n 
only a porhon of the beha\·ior examined. This insight is deri\"ed from soci:1l ~cience generally and regression methodolo~v ~penfic::1llv. It was a liberating 
. "'·;:~:..:. 
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insight for legal scholarship. because it freed ,;cholars from the hurtle~ 
explaining every case and problem and directed their ;mention to the 
identification of general tendencies. ~(any o{ the most inten:sung ;.~nJ 
provocative ideas about law :1dvanced in recent vears-ideas about the 
tendency of common law to further dficiency.~ regubriti~s in contractual 
relationships,, and the interrelationship between criminal behavior and ther 
criminallaw 1-could not have been advanced and investigated without this 
underlying intellectual conception. 
3. A strong regularity of human social behavior is behavior which serves 
the interests of the actor. This premise is drawn [rom the behavioral 
predicates of price theory, where its predictions have proven po\verful and 
useful. It can be used to analyze responses to laws because it leads to the 
prediction that individuals will alter their behavior to avoid the costs of laws 
and to obtain their benefits. This prediction is a prolific generator of 
hypotheses for investigation-for instance. that laws that freeze rents will 
reduce the supply and increase the demand for rental housing;i that laws 
that restrict entry into an industry will reduce its output:• and that laws that 
tax or punish an activity will reduce its frequency. 7 
The emphasis on this premise in law-and-economics work has led to 
criticism of the work on the ground that it inculcates amoral habits of 
thought. But the premise that self-interest is a strong regularity of human 
behavior does not logically require the hypothesis that people will behave in 
antisocial ways. Rather, self-interest can explain precisely why people do 
conform to the moral and legal norms of the social community. The gains 
from trade can only exist if each individual is prepared to cooperate ,,·ith 
others, and the moral and legal norms of society can be understood as the 
framework which makes such trade possible. 
2. Paul H. Rubin. Wh,· b th<" Common Law E!!ici.-m?. 6 J. L<"gal Stud. 51 t 1977>; (;.-on;<" L. 
Pri.-st. Th.- Common L..tw Pr<Xt"'i> .md th<" S.-1.-ctton of E!!ici.-nt Rul.-s. 6 J. Le~~:al Stud . .;:, 
( 1977>. 
:5 . .\nthonv T. !Von man &: Richard .\. Posn~r. The Economics of Contract La..- t Bo>ton: 
Little. Brown. 19i9). Richard A. Posn.-r Be And~w ;\l. Rosenfidd. Impossibility and Rdat~ 
Doctrin~s in Contract ww: .\n Economic Analysis. 6 J. Legal Stud. 83 ( 19771; Charl<"s J. 
G~tz &: Robt"n E. Scott. Principks of Rdational Contracts. 6i Va. L. Rev. 1089 119811: 
Charles J. G~u &: Robt"rt E. Scott. Enforcing Promises: .\n Examination of th<" Bash of 
Contract. 89 Val<" L. J. 1261 ( 1980); Charles J. Go.-tz &: Robert E. Scott, ~l<"asuring Sdlt-r> 
Damages: The Lon Profits Puzzk. ll Stan. L Rev. j2:5 ( 1979); Charles J. GO<"u &: R.ob<"n E. 
Scott. Liquidatt"d Damages. Penahi<"s and the just Compensation Principle: Some :-o:otcs un 
an Enforc.-ment :l.todd and a Theory of Efficient Breach. 77 Colum. L R.-v. 351 119i7l. 
1. Gary S. lkck.-r &: William :'lot. Landes • ..ds .. Es.ays on th<" Economics uf Crim<" anJ 
Punishment<=""<""' York: National Bur<"au of Economic R.-s.-arch. 19Hl. 
3. Edgar 0. Olsen •. \n Economist's Analysis of Rent Control. 80 ]. Pol. Econ. 101!1 ll9i2•. 
6. lkcause the r.-striction on t"ntry reduces the potential competition. This point onlv holt!s •f 
the restriction on entry dfecti•·ely limits the ~ntry of additional economic r.-wurces. rath.-r 
than simply firms. or ..-h.-n the r.-gulation restrains dficient m<"thods of competition b~ 
those firms in th<" industry. Th.- first effect was, for instance. docum.-nted in th<" taltiCJb 
industry. Edmund W. Kitch. ~larc lsaacwn &: Dani.-1 Kasper. Th.- R.-gulation of Ta'(irJb> 
in Chicago. 1-1 j. L &: Econ. 28~ (1971). The second df.-ct was docum.-m.-d in the Julonc 
indusU)'. S.-.- th<" summary of th<" litt"rature in Steph.-n G. Br<"Y<"r. Regulation and h\ Rdor 111 
(Cambridg.-• .\lass.: Han·ard t:niv. Pr.-ss, 1982). 
7. William .\1. Landes. An Economic Study of U.S .. \ircraft Hijacking, l961-l9i6. 21 J. L. 1.: 
Econ. I tl9i8). 
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& 4. Marginal rather than gross or average effects are the important dfects to 
analyze in understanding human response to law. This insight is also 
derived from price theory where it is used. for example. to prove the 
counterintuitive proposition that a business that loses money will continue 
to operate.• Past costs are sunk costs and have no bearing on decisions in the 
present. The cows-and-corn example in Coa:;e's social-cost article is a 
notable example of the use of this insight:' once the liability system has been 
established. it is a nonmarginal cost which does not affect production 
decisions. ~larginal analysis is critical to understanding the output dfects of 
price discrimination and thus the effect of antitrust Jaws that proscribe price 
discrimination.l 0 It is important for analyzing the effect of various transfer 
and tax progrc~ms, whose dfect must be gauged in terms of how they affect 
marginal incenti\·es. 11 
5. Observed stable behavior is an indicia of an equilibrium that serves the 
objectives of those who sustain it. There are many versions of this idea but it 
is presented here in the form that has been most important for legal 
scholarship: as a guide to inquiry. h is a usdul counter to complex 
predictive models including those generated from price theory. for it guards 
against the theorist's tendency to disregard, as either abberralional or 
antisocial. behavior that does not fit his predictions. The richness of the best 
law-and-economics scholarship reflects the tension between the predictions 
of rigorous price-theory models and careful in..-estigation and analysis of 
actual behavior by firms, courts, or legislatures. This guide was pioneered in 
the antitrust area, where business phenomena such as tie-in sales, restrictive 
distribution agreements. and long-term contracts that did not fit the 
predictions of simple spot-market-price theory had been explained as 
monopolistic. h turned out th:u by analysis of the actual practices reponed 
in the cases in light of the question "how could the business benefit from 
this practice?:· many of these practices could be understood in light of a 
multiperiod cornpetiti\'e model.1 7 Similarly. phenomena st:ch as the failure 
universally and uniformly to enforce criminal laws can be better understood 
if they are studied and analyzed in terms of the costs and benefits of criminal 
law enforcement rather than simply deplored as a failure of the system.'' 
6. Goods and services are multidimensional, and regulation of one 
dimension will affect the other dimensions of the good or service. This 
principle is important because laws frequently affect only one aspect of a 
complex set of interactions. For example, economic regulation often 
regulates only the price at which a good or service can be sold without 
regulating the quality and conditions under which it is sold. Sellers will 
8. lkcau5t thne losSM are accounting los~s on fixnJ capi1al that has no ~Iter use. 
9. Ronald H. C.oa~. The Problem o( Social Cmt. :$ J. L &: Econ. I. 2-6 ( 1960). 
10. Richard .-\. Posner lie Frank H. East~rbrook. ,\ntitrust: Ca~. Economic Not~s. and Oth<'r 
:\l;u~rials. 2d nJ., 9H, I H. 9118-1:19 {St. Paul. :\linn.: W<'11 Publishing Co .• 1!181 ). 
II. S~e. <'.g .. Rtchard .-\ . .\lu,gra"e &: Pr~g~ B . .\lu~~~:rave. Public ~-inanct' in Theorv ami 
Pranice. jd t'tl .. jOI-2:$ 1:-:.-w York: :\lcGraw-Hill. 1!1110). 
12. S<'f' the diK"u"iun and lit.-rature citrd 111 Robrrt H. Bork. The Antitrust J>ar:~do,.: .\ Pnlit v 
at War with h><"lf. :!80-:!09 ( :-.:.-w Ynrk: B.J,it· B<><>k,, 1971!). 
ll. C<"<H~r r --;11~1<-r. Thr Opcirnurn Enlort c·rn<'lll •>I La"·· iH J Pol. Et on .. ·.~r; 1 19701 
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respond to ;1 con~tr:Jmt on pnce bv chan~rng one of the qualuy parameters. 
Only if all parameters within the comrol of the seller are regulated, can these 
effects be controlled. When this principle is used in umjunction with the 
earlier pnnciples, it can yield sub!le hvpotheses. For instance, ~afety 
regulation will not increase safety, ~cause the existing amount of "safetv" 
reflects a preexisting equilibrium an'd if one input to safety is incre;lSed bv 
law, the panicipams will increase other inputs to risk in order to return 
toward the previous equilibrium.•• In utility regulation, where many 
parameters of the service are regulated bu,.~_price is based on a formula related 
to investment, this insight leads to predft~lons about the interaction between 
output regulation and investment ded~ions in the form of the :herch-
johnson-Wellisz hypothesis. 15 This insight also helps to explain why 
particular anticrime measures may have little impact on crime rates. 
7. In evaluating the effects of laws, the multiparty, private transactional 
response is important. It is important to look beyond the reactions of a single 
individual to a rule of law and look at the systematic responses open to 
groups of individuals. If zero transaction costs are assumed. the Coase 
theorem comes into play and gener:ues the corollary that law will nut 
mauer. 16 Although the zero-transaclion~cost assumption is unrealistic. the 
theorem suggests that one should be wary of concluding that laws have large 
eCCects where the parties affected are in-continuing and regular bargaining 
relationships with each other. Since they have already incurred the costs of 
bargaining, the marginal cost of adding anew topic-the new law-to their 
agenda is low, and it is plausible to expect complex muhipany arrangements 
to offset its effects. For example, one should expect that in response to a tax 
the parties involved in the taxed transaction will attempt to rearrange the 
transaction so as to reduce the amount of the tax. Workers and employers 
will respond to an income tax by convening what would otherwise be 
income into an expense. Or affected parties may cooperate in the operation 
of black markets or leave the jurisdiction. 
8. In evaluating any market or regulatOry arrangements. it is important to 
compare the arrangement being evaluated against other viable institutional 
alternatives. It is a simple intellectual matter to demonstrate the imperfec· 
tions of markets and administration. but itis an intellectual exercise of little 
interest. Since perfection is not attainable. one should search for the best 
available. 
• 
1-t. Sam Pehzman. The Effects of .\u1omobile Safety Re~lation. ~3 J. Pol. Econ. 6ii 1 19751. 
15. The effect is the response o{ the firm to a constraint on its prices base-d upon rate of return 
where the firm responds by increasing its capital base. Harvey Averch 8c Leland L Johnson. 
Behavior o( 1he Firm under Regulatory Constro~int. 52 Amer. Econ. Rev. 1052 119ti:!_l; 
Stanislaw H. Wellisz. Re~lation o{ :'lla1ural Gas Pipeline Companies: An EconorniC 
Analysis. 71 J. Pol. Econ. jQ (1963). 
16. Since the effects law has ..;ill ~ costlessly overcome by agreements among the afkct.,.l 
parties. returning the arrangements to 1hosc they prcfcrrcd in the first place. From the ~w,nt 
of view of a legal scholar. it is unfonuna1e that mmt of the literature on the Coasc thcorcrn 
has focuS<"d on 1he hypothetical. uact;~blc world where law doc:5 not mauer rather than I he 
actual world with which the law stru~gles. 
• 
• 
• 
. ~y 
.0. The study of kgal history and comparative law is important, beca~se 
~nificant differences in the structure of legal institutions will probably 
nly appear where there are significant differences in the cost conditions 
acing the society. Thus fifty-state American studies may only identify 
jifferences that are so small that they do not mauer-they are essentially the 
random component of the process output-while obscuring the dominant 
and important part of the process. If Massachwetts and Montana are alike in 
the things that matter. then we would expect them to disagree only on things 
that do not matter. To understand the really important aspects of our own 
legal system, we may need the comparative mirror of law generated by a very 
different culture. This leads to an agenda of study and analysis of 
institutions as diverse as the medieval commons,•• property rights in 
primitive societies, 19 and the organization of soci:ilist economics.20 
Legal scholars have, of course, long realized the importance of historical 
and comparative studies. But these studies have been largely descriptive. Law 
and economics provides an analytic framework that can provide unifying 
direction to comparative and historical work. For instance: (a) Contractual 
relations have had varying scope within societies. What social variables 
account for the varying scope accorded to social ordering through contract? 
(b) What effects have different forms of economic ordering had on the 
productivity of societies? (c) Do legal institutions operate systematically to 
enhance human welfare; do they operate to protect and maintain the 
position of those in political power; do they have no effect; or should they be 
understood in some entirely different framework? If these questions should 
be answered differently in different societies. or at different times. what 
accounts Cor these diHerences? 
II. Factual Insights 
Law and economics has also been associated with a series of factual 
insights that have been important to contemporary American legal 
scholarship. 
1. Markets have strong efficiency properties. Using only price theory it is 
possible to argue that markets are e££icient. or, conversely, that they are beset 
by fatal imperfections. How well markets operate in practice is a question of 
fact. Are the theoretical imperfections important in practice or are they 
17. johnS. MeG«. Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.j.) CaW', I j. L lie Econ. 1~7 
(1958); G,.ry T. Schwartz. Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth C.:ntury America: A 
Reinterp~tation, 90 Yale L J. 1717 (1981 ). 
18. Donald N. McCloskey, The Penis1enu or En~lish Common Fields. in European Peasanu 
and Their Markets, ed. William N. P:.arker llc Eric L Jones (Princt.'lon. N.j.: Princeton lTniv. 
Press, 19i5); Donald N. McCloskey, The Economics of Enclosu~. in id.: Carl J. Dahlman. 
The Open Field System and Beyond (('.ambrid~e: Cambridge Univ. Press. 1980). 
19. Richard A. Posner. A Theory or Primitive Society. with Special Reference to Law. 23 j. L.llc 
Econ. I (1980). 
20. john H .. \loore. Agency Casu. Technological Change. and Soviet Central Planning. 2-1 J. 
L !c Econ. 189 ( 1981 ) . 
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relatively unimportant? The rise of bw and economics has been correla;;;; 
with a change in the inrellectual climate. which has become more receptive 
co the view that markets are an effective form of social organization in many 
situations. This change in the general inrellectual climate has made 
academic lawyers more interested in the private-law structures that support 
the operation of markets and more receptive to policy approaches that use 
private-market institutions. This has in turn made economics more relevant 
co law. 
Law and. economics has itself made only a small contribution to this 
change. The ~cholars of the 1930s who viewed markets as prodw.:ing 1 
situation in which millions were idle and hungry could hardly have bee.; 
expected to have faith in the inevitable ordering properties of the ''invisible 
hand." Nor did their background include any extensive experience with 
large-scale government economic management. The Interstate Commerce 
Commission, which was their most ambitious domestic precedent, was timid 
by modern standards of economic intervention. ~o wonder they said to 
themselves, "There must he a better way." 
By contrast. the current generation of scholars has seen the power of 
markets to generate private production in the post-World War world and 
experienced first-hand the imperfections of bureaucratic management. On 
an intellectual level, it has been possible to place the Depression in historical 
perspective and to come to understand the role of the Federal Reserve Board 
in sustaining and extending the long downward economic spiral of the early 
'30s. 21 
Law and economics has played a role in this large and important 
transformation of perceptions in one respect. The antitrust-industrial-
organization work has shown that many of the market failures attributed to 
barriers to entry. predatory practices, and monopoly extension are not in 
practice significant problems. :z 
It is this element of law and economics that probably accounts for the view 
of some that it is an intellectual movement hopelessly tainted by ideology. 
An appreciation of the power of markets to release human energies for 
public ends inevitably leads to nonsocialist prescriptions. The interesting 
thing is that the efficiency properties of markets are now so widely 
appreciated that this finding is seldom challenged. In the days of classic 
socialist theory, it was possible to argue that the emerging scale of produc· 
tion was so large that all markets would be dominated by monopolies. 
Ironically, the very technological progress that made large-scale production 
efficient also led to means of transportation and communication that vastly 
expanded the geographic scope of markets. This has forced socialist political 
theorists to abandon price theory to the liberals. 
2. Much social behavior can be illuminated through rigorous use of self· 
21. Milton Friedman &: Anna jacobson Schwartz. A ;\.lon~tary History o( th~ l'nitt"-1 Stal<"'' 
1867-1960. 299-·\19 (Princ~ton, :-l.J.: Princ~ton Univ. Pr~s. 1%.1). 
22. Phillip Ar~ffia &: Donald F. Turn~r. ~Antitrust Law. passim and ~c. 711b, ac 152 (B0\1°11: 
· Liul~. Brown, 1978). 
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interest-maximization models, indu'ding such areas of noncommer~ 
behavior as polidcal behavior,23 family behavior, 2• and criminal behavior.2~ 
3. Private-law rules mauer and invoh·e policy issues as fundamental and 
important as public-law rules. One of the reasons that law and economics 
has been so well received in law schools is that it has addressed in an 
interesting way the concerns of the private-law lawyer-the rules of 
contracts, tons, and propeny.25 For the preceding thirty years public law had 
been on the rise in American law schools and had auracted the most 
ambitious minds. In contras.t, prh·ate law came to be viewed as narrow and 
rechnicaL Law and economics placed private law in a larger policy context 
and generated vigorous literatures on liability rules and the nature and 
structure of contracting and property systems. Since private Jaw does in fact 
mauer. this more rigorous and systematic method of approaching issues of 
rhe significance of private-law rules was a useful corrective. 
4. Economic regulation often has. effects which are adverse to social 
welfare and is often imposed and maintained for the purpose of protecting 
the interest of the firms regulated. Law and economics, and particularly the 
industrial-organization literature associated with law and economics, docu-
mented a stunning series of failures in the structure of the economic 
regulation that lay at the heart of the New Deal's faith in economic 
management. These demonstradons focused on agencies tht restricted entry 
(airlines, trucks, communications common carriers), restricted .pricing 
freedom (railroad, utility regulation, Robinson-Patman Act), or prevented 
the creation of private property rights (broadcast regulation).:l1 In case after 
case it was possible to show, on the basis of rather elementary price theory 
and economic data, that these supposedly "scientific" regulatory regimes 
resulted in a social loss. protected politically powerful groups, and did not 
have the efficiency effects claimed for them . 
23. Amhony Downs •. -\n Economic Throry of Offllocracy ~~~w York: Har~r &: Row, 1957). 
24. Gary S. lkckc.-r, .-\ Trc.-ari~ on th~ Family (Clmbridgc-. :\lass.: Han·ard Univ. Pre-ss. 1982). 
25. Gary S. lkckc.-r. Crime- and Punishmc-nc An Economic Approach, 76 ]. Pol. Econ. 169 
(19681. 
26. S« H~nry G. :\!anne-. ed .. The- Economics of Legal R~lationships: Rndings in th~ Throry 
of Pro~ny Rights 1S1. Paul, ~inn.: W~sl Publishing Co .• 19i~); Kronman Be Posn~r. supra 
not~ 3: Guido Calabresi. So~ Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the- Law of Tons, 70 
Yale L. J. ~99 ( 1961 ); John Prather Brown, Toward an Economic Throry of Liability, 2 J. 
L~gal Stud. 323 ( 1973); N~il K. Kom~r. Toward a C~n~ral Throry of Pe-rsonal Injury Law. 
3 J. Lc.-gal Srud. H7 ( 1974); Guido Calabrc.-si &: A. Douglas :\ldamw. Pro~rty Rul~s. 
Liability Rul~s. and lnali~nability: On~ Vi~w of the- Cathe-dral, 85 Harv. L RC'V. 101!9 
(1975). 
27. Much of this lite-rature- is to be found summarizw in Bre-ye-r. supra note- 6, and AICrC'd E. 
Kahn. The- Economics ol Re-gulation: Principlc.-s and lnsritutions (~C'W York: john Wile-y&: 
Sons. 1970). Se-minal studic.-s include- Richard E. Cave-s, Air Tr:rnspon and its RC"gUiators: 
An Jndus1ry Study (Cambrid~ • .\lass.: Harvard Univ. PTC"ss, 1962): Paul W. MacAvoy,.Thc-
Economic Elf«ts of R~gulation: The- Trunklinc- Railroad Carte-ls and the- Inte-rstate 
Comme-rce Commission be-fore- 1900 (Cambridge-, ~lass.: M.I.T. Pre-ss, 1965): Paul W. 
:\lac.·hoy. Priu Formation in Natural G 'S Fields (Ne-w Ha,·c-n, Conn.: Yale- Univ. Pre-ss, 
1962): Grorge I. Sri~tlc.-r, Public R~gulation of the.- S~curitic-s :\larkc-u, 37 J. Bus. 117 ( 196-1); 
Ronald H. CoaSC', The- F~deral Communicalion) Commission. 2 J. L. k Econ. I (19~9) . 
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Reflections on Professional 
Education, Legal Scholarship, and 
the Law-and-Economics Movement 
Fnn{c. I. Michd~n 
3.! J. U:pj Educ. 197 c 198ll. 
* * * 
I off~ my thoughts about some of the precepts of analytical 
method that Kitch has approvingly ascribed to law and economics. 
I. Ch«king the Foundations 
I. The!' subje!'C't co be!' suldie!'d is 10 be!' concrive!'d o{ u a sys~ o{ constraints and l't'Wards 
incnactinc with individuals. A cmcral objective' ol law-and-«onomia teholanhip has 
bftn co anal~x the!' incC!'J'a<tion bet~ a I!S&em ol rules aad che!' bC!'haviOI' ol indh.-cduals in 
ruder to dtotnmint' the!' dfC!'Cls ol the!' rulft.' 
I have no quarrel with this formulation of an objective (or law-and· . 
~conomia scholarship. with its value. or with the commitment to it o{ much 
Fraak L Mic.hch"aa !• PTolnsor ol uw, Harvard l'ni""""cy • 
!. Edmund W. !Uu:h.lnwll«tual Foundalions oluw and Econonlics. !3 J. Lqa1 Educ. 114 
( 191131. 
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of the relevant scholarship with which I am acquainu::d. I pause only to not~ 
that the objective will be attainable only insofar as the analyst can rigorous I\· 
hold apart the supposedly independent behavioral regularities and thc:-
obscrved "effecu oi the (legal] rules." There is constant danger of the anal\·. 
sis collapsing into tautology through reading of the ob.s<rved outcorr.c ~c.l.;. 
into the behavior-al suppositions. For example. the prevailing legal rule ts 
that you are not required to put in an ap~r.1nce at the polls on election 
day. Still. substantial numbers do so. despite the apparent futility of this 
expenditure of time and energy from the standpoint of the economiZing 
inc:tiVIciuar. TI would be both tautological and obscuranrist to infer from this 
state of affairs that people have a "taste" for the act of voting as such. 
It would be very ne:~~t ii the central thesis of ~nomic analysis were that its 
axiomatic presupposition of individualistically "rational'' behaviorl were 
sufficient, by itself or in combination· with extra-behavioral facu about 
re50urce scaccity, technology. etc .• to determine the effects of a given legal 
event. Were that the thesis. empirical inspection of actual results could 
certainly provide a rigorous. pragmatic test. (For example. the voting 
phenomenon apparently would defeat the thesis). Conversely. firm predic-
tions of leg2l impact would be available for as long as the thesis held up. 
However, as just about everyone is bv now aware. the"rational"-bchavior 
axioms do not pretend by themselves to determine predicted results. 
Conversely, they are strictly nonfalsifiable. They are formal propositions 
only, which can cut no empirical ice without additional concrete input 
about the actual, particular motivations of those subject to the investigaoon. 
(In the voting case, everything depends on our imputations to people of 
"tastes" for voting.) And that means trouble. 
3. A uron!l( ~britY of hum.:an social ~h.avior is ~h.avtor which snvn th~ inl~e-5l of th~ 
~ctor. This p~mi~ ... an ~ uw-d to ~n.alv1~ r~sponsn to l~w' ~u~ it l~:ach to th~ 
p~iction th:at indi•·iduah wall alt~r th~tr ~h;&vior to ~•oad rh~ cosu of l:aws and to obcaan 
thrir bn\dits.. Thi1 pr~tctton is .. prohfic ~~n..,.acor ol hvpoche-5n for '""~Sllif:llion. 
~- O~t'd u.abl~ ~h.avior u .. n andiCl.a ol "" c-qualibnum th.ac 'lrl"'rt"S th~ objKti•·n ol 
thoK who sust.aan 11. . . (Thn uJn 1 ... I{Uardi a~inSt th~ tht"orut 1 t~nd~no co disr~li(:Jrd 
~uh~r :as :a~rr.uion:al or .anusoca;,al brh:n·ior that don noc fia hn pr~actions. Th~ nchnMs 
of th~ ~~ law-and-..-conomao ... holanhap rroflrocli thr tr'n\lon ~~W~r'n th~ pr~ictaon1 oi 
rigorous prtc~ cheoo· modt"b .1nd c:.rc-ful•n•c-su~JIIOn ~nd analysu ol actual ~h:a•·tor. 
Precept 3 does not help much to avert the trouble. lt would. if ''imere5t". 
wer~ used in the sense of the identifiable obf~crrv~ good of an actor whtch 
may or may not accord with the latter"s currenr desires or conduct.~ A the5ts 
that persons regularly act. willy-nillv. in accordance with objectivelv 
idemiliable "interest" would certainly be fahifiable. But that does not seem 
10 be the one J(jtch has in mind. He means. rather. that pc::ople regularly act 
3. "'R:ation.al"' for p~wnc purpo~s Tlnns opumirintr on o~·s aht"m:ati~s. thus ma•imirin~ 
on~·· \.acnf::~cuoni. b• conunuoul 1nd1n~ off lr rhr" manpn. ~ discussaon. ~low. of 
._i&eh"s Pr...-cropu ~- 6 . ..1nd; >;a nee .hu u.'" mv .. ,. .... _ ..1 f)<"<Ulto.r ..1nd conuracr~ """"" 01 
naion:.liay. I ,h .. ll conunuC" 10 ~nclow- th<" ""oru tn -c"rro·quoar-1 whe-n I uw- 11 1hus. 
~- KiiC h. supr• not~ 2. ~~ I a8-119. 
~- As u·is !oOm<"CJmM uw-d '" ... ,pl;,on:.uon• oJ p.llt"rnalum .u ..~cuon '" ..1 pr-r~n·, •nt<"fMI 
.r~dlns •>I ah;u prnon • (urJTnl '"'"hn . 
-. 
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in punuit o£ their interests as currently expenenced by themsdves. And cr.w.t 
theorem u nonfalsifiable. i.e .. tautological. except insofar as inve5ugators 
h.ave some way, independent of the behavior that the th~is meam to predict. 
o£ ~ertaining the concurrent motivational e:"tperience o{ their subjects. 
That this i.s indeed possible. to 5ome worthwhile extent. is the implication 
o{ K.!c.ch's formulation o{ the thesis in terms of "the casu" and "the benefits" 
o( ~c.crnauve responses to laws. What that language ~s to imimate is that 
various consequences may be identifiable by investigaton a.s serving or 
disserving the subjective interests of the members of a population simply on 
the basis of common ~nsc. shared experience. and accumulating positive 
knowledge derived (rom prior. common-sense-based hypoth~. The thesis. 
then. is that a population will respond to a legal event by "rationally" 
moving to minimize cons or maximize benefits a.s thos~ would lu typicall)l 
t'fl4.lualed in lh~ common cultur~ shared by the population and the 
im;estigators. What really. ultimately "generates . . . hypotheses for 
inv~tigation" is nothing more or less than the investigator's common-~nsc 
suppositions about what people ~nerally want and do not want. 
Mod~t as that position may be. it does move us back from the brink o£ 
tautology. Things can turn out detectably different from what was predicted 
in a speci{ic case. and if they do, we will know the analyst was wrong about 
something: either the particular attribution of concrete subjecti\·e inter~t~ to 
the population. or the general theorem that people behave "rationally'" so as 
to 50"Ve their interests. 
Howcover. it is jusr this ine:"tpungible possibility of equivocation on which 
gues was wrong,-that concerning the content o£ the inter~ts or that 
concerning the "'rationality'" o( the behavior-which leaves the economic 
perspective on human events finally lacking substantive content. as a hard 
look at Precept 5 will certainly show. The analyst may sometimes be proved 
wrong. about something, but it will not ever be the '"rational'" ·behavior 
axiom any more than it will be the attributions of contingent motive. The 
"r3tional" ·behavior premise. and iu sophistic:ued trans(orm<uions into the 
art3lytic apparatus of microeconomics. are just a way~ften. to be sure. a 
powerfully clarifying way~( organizing thought and e:"t~rience about 
where the sundry ends and moti\·ations of interacting. culturally conditioned 
humans will carry them if subjected to this or that set of institutional 
constraints. 
The point is not that one does not sometimes. even often. obtain a useful 
purchase on the world by thus shuttling between '"rigorous price theory 
models'" and '"careful investigation and analysis of actual behavior ... Rather. 
it is that the '"tensions'" in the picture exist. not between '"rigorous ... 
models" on the one hand and refractory behavioral material on the other. 
but between potentiaUy conflicting bodies oC particular behavioral/motiva-
tional material: those insuted into the model at moments of prediction. and 
those read out of it at moments of oL~rvation. The imaginative entities 
behind the predictions and the tensions are aU-depending on point of 
view--either (objective) behaviors or (subjective) interests. The model is an 
interpretive apparatus for organizing and editing experience so as to make 
intelljgible and comparable the phenomena-~haviors or interesu-wa 
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predict and those we ob~rve. As such. the model is ·optional, es~.:cially 
insomuch as there is pfenty of plainly significant ex~icncc that it quite 
fails to apture or explain.' 
The essence of the mode! can be found embedded in Kitch's fourth. sixth. 
and seventh analytical precepu. 
-l. :wfarJinal rathn than !fOSS or avna~ df«U are ttw important dfcas to analyzr in 
undn'Slandins human rnponse to law .... [For ~pie.) past casu are sunk cases ~nd 
ha'~ no bnrins on decisions in the prexnt. 
6. Coods and servica are mullidimftlSionaJ and ~&ion ol one dimension will alfn:t 
ttw ocher dimensions ol the good or service. ... For instance. safety r~Jation will noc 
ii'1Crnte safety b«:3use the exiscin5 amount ol"'salet·r· rril«U a prt"e~Utin" equilibrium. 
and if one input to salery is incrn.wd by law, the panicipants will inernse othn' inpuu cu 
risk in order to mum toward the previous equilibrium. 
7. In e"'alua&.ins the df«U of Law. the multiparty private transactional rnponse is 
imponanL ... If zero transaction casu are assumed. the Coate theorem comes into pial' 
and ~en the corollary that the law will noc mann: ... [O)ne should~ waf! ol 
condudinr that Laws haw- Larre df«U wh~ the parries aifcaed are in continuins and 
resuw barpinins relationships with t"Xh ocher.' 
These pre(:epu suike me as much alike in both content and meriL All are 
descriptive of the same mode of "rationally'' calculative behavior-in whi.ch 
the key ide:1., are the closely interrelated one-s of optimization by marginal 
choice ("trade-off' governed by a "rate of substitution'') and competitive 
equilibrium-which law-and~conomio practitionen suppo~ will govern 
individual and socieial respon~ to legal eventS. and which, as they have 
weJl taught. will ohen lead to counterintuitive results. 
Taking these as standing. suong reminden of things "one should be 
wary" of overlooking in insuumental appraisals of law actual or prospective. 
I consider these precepts to be true and valuable conuibutions of law-and-
economics work to the fund of critical understanding that :should guide the 
efforts of reform-minded lawyen and law professors. The kinds of respomc-s 
they dC"SCTibe are assuredly common. and the effects of tho~ response-s on 
legal impacu are liable to be overlooked without prompting from the! 
analytical habits and methods that the5e precepts repre5ent. 
Still. issues of no slight importance are suppressed by the categorical tone 
' in which the precepts are offered. Among mistakes one ought to be wary of. 
after all. are such suppositions as that "past costs [categorically) ... have no 
bearing on decisions in the present"; that "if one input to safety is incre:ued 
by law, the participants (categoriolly] will increa.se other inputs to risk": 
and that, by virtue of the Coa.se theorem. "i£ ... transaction costs are 
assumed (to be negligible], ... the law will not matter." Understood as 
6. Warren J. Samurls. an ~omisc. puu th~ mann rhis w-•y: 
An, bfohavior or area ollirco rh:u an be '~iCicod in tC'rm" ol :1 maximization probl"" 
will t"'"idC"nce ""t>connmrc·· chancrcon"ucs. Sur thco m01ximizin~ conclusions will be du«" 
to rhC" p;.r01di~m wuh which tht phC"nomC"non as intcorprcorcod and not to th«- ··nat uno'" of 
thco ph«"nomconun indf. .\ltcorn.ari"dy. the- phmomconon may be antt'llil(rblf' 10 tf'Tms o4 
W"Vf'f21 uillcononr paradi!{T1ls. ;,nd th«"no :~reo no cnrt'n" dic~unlf chore co amon~ p01raurl(ms. 
WarTnt 'J. S:.mUI'Is. :'ofaximuarion of Wnhh u Jusucco. 00 Tt"xas L Rev. 1-47. 16-4 (1981 l. 
7. !Uich, suprc n~ 2. ~~ 189·90 . 
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depietioru o{ or_ derivations from a ~~cial n.ormallv~ standard o[ r.uional 
conduct. such GltegoriGlJ scatemenu are inconte3table. Undenwod .u 
ch.ancteri.z.;uions o{ what we acluaily are like and how we actuaily ~have. 
the-y are hall-truths sure to mi.slead. Which geu w to Precept 2. f 
Z. Th~ pwpow ol JCienti{i.c: a!1411,sis is 10 idn~til, che 'Y•~~tic componenc ol phenomena . 
and ~- chat compo~WN {rom cJu r.andom phenomm~ A s-mcnHucion is u~ul and 
wonnwbik neon il it an c-xpbin only a ponion ol chc behnior eumine'd.' 
If an elegant theory appears to aplain, in the correlational sense. a 
~pcct.able amount o{ the variance in a set oC observations. there will be 
some tendency to piaure the variance remaining unexplained by that theory 
as unsystematic. random. impenetrable muck lacking signifiance-what 
statisticians call "the re3iduaJs.'• Thus may one be led to think that the 
distinctive behavioral theorems of economic analysis (see the preceding 
di.scwsion oC Kitch's Precepts 4, 6. and 7) are the only one1 capable of 
making comprehensible the legal phenomena chat intere3t us. 
Critic oi law and economics (mysdf included) believe the opposite is true: 
that is. that the marginally trading--off (some critic would all it the 
.. commodity'') form of consciousness and behavior posited by law and eco-
nomic is only one side of the story o{ what people-us-are and can be like: 
that the story has other sides, no le1s coherent or authentic to wh~er is in a 
frame of mind co receive them:and chat we. e3pecially as we act through our 
convers.tions with each other. are \·err much the agents of our own 
conditioning and the authon of our own story. 
ln other words. which is the "systematic"' component and which the 
"random"' is very. much in the eye of the beholrler. There are perspectives-
no« so un£amiliar, after aJl-in which mercantile behavior on the part of a 
parent apparently ready to sell his child for a good profit over what he would 
luve paid for it. or even something as prosaic as the sale of votes or office1. 
would definitely fall into the random fraction. 
No one. so far as 1 know, question!\ that "a generalization is usdul and 
worthwhile even if it an explain only a portion of the behavior e:'ltamined." 
To trumpet this point is, as ~fark Kelman has had occ:1sion to observe.' to 
miss what critics are driving at when chey point to empirical deviations from 
che asserted behavioral regularities of price theory. Explanations-schemata 
that serve to organize some signific:mt fraction of ex~ience-are useful. to 
put it mHdly, and that includes law and economics. The critial point is to 
avoid mistaking an organizing construct for a structural reality chat, by 
defining the possible. limiu vision and deadens will. 
That. indeed. would sc-ern to be che me3~ge of Kitch· s own Precept I 0: 
10. Th~ Hudv ol 1~1 history and comp;u;uavr l~w il ampon~nc bc-c-.. u~ >~lltTl•lic;anc 
dilfeTencn an che >true tun- oll~l insut~.ocion' wtll probablv onlv appear when• <here Jre 
•icniCianc dilfeTn:cn in chc- cosc condiuon> l;,canlf >Oeaetr .... To undenc;and <he rnlly 
imponanc UJ)e'Clt ol our o-wn le~l >v11em. we """'" n~ <he comp.u:aci"e marr-v ol law 
~~~ b, ;t ven diHn-enc·cuhun-.•• 
&. ttL 31 190. 
'}. ~ ~l.uk C. Krlman. Spaucr Jnci Hollm:.on nn c., • ..,,.\ iltt<'l Rqoan<l<'r. 'll )o C ... L L. Rrv. 
121.S. 1219-~1 ( 191101. 
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This precept I regard ;u ~xhibiting both a truth of surpassing import:Jnct" 
;~nd a paradox. Iu truth is that one comej ro define and perceive. and thus tu 
undentand. one's own cu!ture-one·s own intellectual situation-only b..,. 
imagining alternative possibilities. It i.s by simultaneously providing us 
with the means of imaginative escape. and suggesting to us what our own 
consciousness is not. that the sympathetic study of quite other cultures mav 
allow us to form .some scJf-obscrvant sense of what our own consciousness ts. 
One does not escape one's fenen. though. by dragging "them along; and 
one will not ever get much of a look at one's own intellectual predicament if 
one always ~tarts b'! projecting that predicament onto the foreign ground 
from which one ho~ to catch a true glimpse of home. If all you think to 
search for in other cultures is correlation ~tween variations in .. cost 
conditions" and "the structure of legal institutions," you foreclose the 
possibility of recognizing a culture in which one of the comrollin~ 
"conditions" is that crucial prompung.s and motivations do not take the 
"commodity" form of marginally imerchange:~ble "costs" at all. And so ,·ou 
may fail to see that one of the distinguishing and conungem features of our 
own thought process is its relentless urge to reduce every motivation to 
a cost . 
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NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
1. What does Kitch assert is the subject-matter of law and 
economics (his Precept ll? What caution does Michelman make 
abo:ol.l t that? 
"':• 
..... What does Kitch assert is the majo:ll'" 
regularity'') in human social behaviour (Precept 3)? (Posner makes 
the same assertion). Of that, Michelman says that Kitch really 
holds that 
"a po:opulation will respo:•nd t.:• a legal event by ~rationally' 
moving to minimize benefits ~§ __ !hQ§Q_~QYl~-~§_!~Qi£~llL 
§~§lY§i§9_iD_!h§_£QffiffiQD_£YliY~§_§h§~£~-g~_ih§_QQQYl~!iQD_~DQ 
ib§_iD~§~!ig§!Q~§~ What really ultimately 'generates ... 
hypotheses for investigatioJ is nothing more or less than 
the investigators's common-sense supposition about what the 
people gE·nerall y ,..,.ant and do not want." 
How would Kit£h respond to that criticism? 
4. Speaking of three of Kitch's propositions concerning how 
people behave in a calculating fashion (Pr·ecepts 4, 6 and 7), 
Michelman states that ''understood as characterization of what we 
1 ike and ho•..,. ,..,.e §£!Y~ll~ behave", the p·r·oposi tions 
"are half-t·f'"l.tths likely to:• mislead". Why does he say that? How 
would Kitch and Posner likely respond? 
5. Speaking •:•f Kitch's Precept 2, ~ichelman states. that "•..,.hich 
is the ~ sys. tema tic' component and which is the ~random' 
[ co:•mpo:•nent of behav io1.tr J is very much in the eye of the 
beholdE·r." What does he mean by that? He says also:• that "the 
c·r· it i cal point is to avoid mistaking an organizing co nstruct 
for a structural reality that, by defining the possible, limits 
vision and deadens ,..,.ill." Hoo..-; '"'ould Kitch ·res.pond? Do not §ll 
• 
• vocabularies limit vision? 
-6. Consider Kitch's discussion of the need to study legal history 
and comparative law 10) (it is important "because 
significant differences in the structure of legal institutions 
will probably only appear wher~ there are significant differences 
in the cost conditic•ns facing society"). How does Michelman 
to this? In Michelman's view, what considerations in 
deciding what the law ought to be does Law and Economics compel 
(t/ 
its pfractitioner to adopt? Does Michelman believe that those 
and "the str•-1cture of legal insti tuti•:•ns" as the dependent 
variable) constitute the appropriate considerations to take into 
• account when studying §Y.§r.:t society? What consideratic•ns wc••-lld 
• 
Michelman take into account? Does Kitch believe that "cost 
constitute the YDiY.§:C§~! explanation for all human 
action, everyplace and in every culture? 
7. In your view, who has the better of the argument: Posner and 
Kitch, or Michelman and Samuels? Wh~? 
2. How useful is law and economics f9r determining policy in 
MAKGETLA AND SEIDMAN ''THE APPLICABILITY OF LAW AND ECONOMICS TO 
POLICY-MAKING IN THE THIRD WORLD'', J. Ec. Issues, March, 1989 
CONCLUSION 
In order to test the applicability of law and economics in the Third World context, 
we examined it as theory, considering its methodology, concepts and perspective. To 
examine its central tenets, we recast its argument in a problem-solving format. That 
format requires that we ask, first, what difficulties it aims to solve (that is, what is its 
perspective); second, what explanations it offers for those difficulties; and third, what 
solutions it derives from that analysis. We conclude that, despite its claims to universal 
• 
applicability, as a theory law and economics has questionable utility in solving Third • 
World economic problems. 
I. Methodology. The methodology of law and economics does not seem suitable for 
policymakers in the Third World. They need a methodology that will cope with their 
idiosyncratic problems. That calls for an analytical approach that involves explicit 
specification of a difficulty; the elaboration of alternative explanations and a choice 
between them based on research; alternative proposals for solution (and a choice 
between them as well); and implementation and monitoring. Such a methodology 
encourages policymakers to draw hypotheses, not from a single source, but from the 
entire range of general theories. At every stage, too, it invites - indeed, requires -
research into the specific conditions of the problem addressed. It forces policy makers to 
engage the peculiarities of their own situation while drawing on their own and other's 
experience to guide their research. 
90 Cf. Letf, supra- n. 18, at .. , (·Politics may ... be a method of cementing social solidariy 
through even distributive justice, and the purpose or the political process may indeed be anti· 
efficient and distributively absurd. But. .. 'we' may be getting, overall, what we want.") 
• 
By contrast, law and economics employs an ends-means methodo!ogy that requires 
decisionmakers to commit themsflves to a general solution before undertaking empirical 
research. Governments must seek to recreate in tneir countries the neo-classical ideal; 
research may consider only the most cost-effective means to that end. The extraordinary 
level of abstraction and the positivist organisation of the theory discourage policymakers 
from using experience to test its relevance to their conditions. In the end, this aspect 
also prevents law and economics from itself developing to meet the needs of the-Third 
World. 
2. Perspectives. Law and economics claims that its proposals will help ensure 
efficiency and freedom. Both goals, it asserts, lie in everyone's interest. By implication, 
law and economics addresses the twin difficulties of low productivity and governmental 
constraints on freedom. 
Neither problem adequately reflects the social ills of the Third World. There, for 
the vast majority, poverty and economic powerlessness constrained freedom of choice at 
least as much as government control. Moreover, inefficiency in the existing modern-
sector enterprises does not prove the central cause of low output per capita. That 
problem reflects, rather, the high levels of underemployment and unemployment, which 
• coexist with high productivity in the modern sector. In these circumstances. seeking to 
maximise the efficiency on employed resources alone equates to maintaining economic 
disarticulation and external dependency. Given the weakness of domestic linkages, a 
trickle-down effect to benefit the majority seems unlikely to emerge in the foreseeable 
future. 
The difficulties of inefficiency and inappropriate government intervention in the 
market thus reflected, ultimately. the concerns of the (often foreign) modern-sector 
entrepreneur. To respond to the claims and demands of the majority, Third World 
policymakers ought rather to focus on ameliorating poverty and powerlessness. An 
appropriate theory must then adopt a perspective that looks to the empowerment, not of 
those who already enjoy power and privilege, but of the mass. 
3. Explanations. Law and economics explains inefficiency and limited freedom 
principally by government distortion of the market. Government either fail to establish 
appropriate ground rules, to ensure an efficient market: or, in attempting to overcome 
externalities, fail to mimic market outcomes adequately. That conclusion derives from 
neo-classical models. 
Yet neo-classical models suggest that government intervention ensures inefficiency 
• only if the other conditions of perfect competiton prevail. In the Third World, market 
forces tend to generate factor immobility and monopolisation of the modern sector and, 
'j; 
r-Go with it. extreme income disparities. Moreover, the all-knowing, dispassionate / 
economism of the perfectly competitive entrepreneur is most distinguished by its 
' absence. In the logic of neo~classica~e~conomics, therefore, government intervention 
need not prove the principaL, or even,._major, cause of inefficiency. 
4. Solutions. In the problem-solvir.g agenda, the final task becomes to propose 
solutions for the causes for the problem that the explanations identify. Based on its 
notion that Third World market inefficiency and lack of freedom flows from 
inappropriate government interventions, advisors in the law and economics tendency 
advocate that government cease and desist obvious interventions. In the Third World, like 
the IMF, they must condemn control over foreign exchange, government investment in 
productive enterprises, tax or other incentives, wage or price fixing, and the like. If at 
all, government should seek to achieve the same ends oniy through the manipulation of 
property rights and liabilities to modify externalities. 
Solutions that rest on inadequate explanations must fail. Ultimately. either law and 
economics proposes the impossible solution of using the state to create perfect 
competititon, or it focuses on a siilgle causal factor - the inappropriate provision of 
inalienable rights and other government interventions in the market - without 
providing an adequate theoretical justification. That is one definition of an ideology. The 
resulting measures tend to permit transnational corporations and banks to act with local 
elites to continue to siphon off most of the Third World's income without bringing about 
development. 
While not ensuring efficiency, law and economics solutions neither address nor 
appear likely to ameliorate the economic and political powerlessnes of the majority of 
the Third World's population. Given vast disparities in income and wealth, extending free 
markets to areas previously covered by inalienable rights effectively enhances the 
power of the already-powerful. Ultimately, it requires the weakening or dissolution of 
institutions, such as legislatures and cooperatives, that could bring about greater 
popular participation in political and economic decisionmaking. Proposals derived from 
law and economics thus constitute not part of the solution of poverty and powerlessness. 
but part of their causes. Applied in the Third World, law and economics becomes not a 
theory for development in favour of the mass of the population, but an ideology for the 
preservation of the status quo. 
Neo-classical economics does not provide the only body of economic or policy 
theory that lawmakers can draw upon. Its formality, which gives the impression of 
accuracy, and claim to present general and inescapable truths may make it appear 
attractive. But other bodies of economic thought foster more systematic attention to the 
~· 
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NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
1. Recall Elllckson's account of how ranchers and farmers in 
Shasta County, California dealt with stray cattle. How •.-Jould 
Kitch account for that behaviour? Can he account for it without 
falling into tautology? CThat is, they follow the "goc•d 
neighb•:•ur" set •:.f info·r·mal n•:•rms instead of the law because they 
prefer those norms to those prescribed by the law). Compare 
Michelman's example of voting behaviour. 
2. Warren Samuels concludes a devastating review of Posner's 
principal work <Samuels, Book Review of Posner, !h§ __ g~QDQffii~§_Qf 
.J!d§ii~§ (1'3811, 60 Tex. L. K..ev. 147): 
It is my interpretation. offered here as a hypothesis. that Posner's 
economic approach to law can be described as aJJY or all of the follow-
ing: a manifestation and expreuion of a culturally determined pcrspec- ~ 
tive; a subtle expression and legitimation of social power on behalf of 
the jadiciarr, an attempt to e3C3pc from the freedom aJJd pain of moral .. 
judgment; and a technician's effort to reach determinate solutiotU 
rather than be satisfied with understanding what is going on. Posner's . 
vehicle for all this is, of course. the principle of wealth maximization.. 
To explain this interpretation. we must fU'St clarify the existential 
nature of economic phenomena.. It has been said of-economists that we 
know the price of everything but the value of nothing. On the contrary, 
economists, particularly insofar as we are neoclassicist in character, 
deny that there is. with regard to the exchange value of commodities. 
anything approaching '"value .. as an absolute or metaphysical category 
that transcends price. There is only a network of prices derived from 
the interaction of demaJJd and supply functions that operate within and 
give effect to a changing system of rights, law, preferences. technology. 
population. and so on. For all its emphasis on positivistic. determinis-
tic solutions, such an economics is relativist and existentialist. Pric.e:s 
are only temporary resting places, only codTicic:nu of choice i..n contin-
ual t1tU . 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Consider. for example. equilibrium, or optimal. pnccs. A change 
in physical resource availability, in tastes. in relative entitlements, will 
lead to a change in rei.ative pri~ and. more imporu.ntly, to a change 
in resource allocation. Such prices are made through the market Ot' 
through planning rather th.an found. There is ao unique configuration 
of prices and therefore no unique set of costs or resource allocation. 
and no unique optimal solution. More generally, ap variables, even 
their episodic equilibrium magnitudes, are interdc:pcndent; none is ab-
solute. Even sca.rc:ity i.3 a relativist condition. 
But the economy is a normative process and is so in at least cwo 
respects: normative choice is exercised as to the allocation of resources. 
in pan through tastes, and normative choice is exercised with regard to 
the structure of decisionmaking itself-the structure of rights or of 
power. All this is true of lawm.a.king as well 
One of the characteristics of human choice is the quest for abso-
lute, if not neutral. principles of choice. The purpose of this quest i.3 
somehow to escape the terrible frustration of choice as well as to mask 
or to legitimize the choices actually made. This is a quest pursued by 
individua.ls as they seek to satisfy per30nal choi~ and by individuals 
and groups contributing to social choi~. It is one from ·which Posner 
is not free. 
Posner has his own activism, his own agenda for law, for philoso-
phy. and for judges. His principle of wealth maximiution is deriva· 
tive of the culture of a society that maximizes wealth in Calvinist 
terms. 1" 9 That the principle is not uniquely dispositive by itself of the 
questions to which it is addressed docs not negate its force: it does not 
hamper its ideological function in funher legitimizing and reinforcing 
wealth maximization as a principle of systemic interpretation and 
value. Posner's is an attempt to identify and establish a propaganda for 
"ne version of economic freedom. a ground for cenain economic tiber· 
ties'50 understood in historical terms comprehcmible to a busines.s and 
wealth--oriented civilization. 
Posner seems to believe that he has found in economics an appar· 
ent base for legal" decisionmaking. That his base in economics is itself 
derivative from the parent culture and Wt the principle is no more in 
economics than in law capable of providing uniquely dispositive results 
are her.e, toe:>~ beside the poinL 
. ........ _ ...... 
F. MARXIST LEGAL THEORY 
- '. ·~·.-:· 
CHAMBLISS AND SEIDMAN, LAW, O~DER AND POWER (sup·ra) 
All th~ jurisprudence theories we have thus far examined, except the ''sociological 
jurispruJ~nc~ · · of Eugene Ehrlich, assume (usually without explicitly so stating) a 
con~.:n~u~ so~.:t.:ty. Marxism, like many other theories, arose to explain why the 
Eng!i~htenment"s drt!am failed. Unlike those other theories, however, it postulated a 
~.:on:lict soci.:ty. In that society. the haves generally had both privilege and power. 
They exc:r~·i~~J their power to maintain their position and to exploit the masses. In that 
view. the mk of law model did not work the way some dreamed it might, to alleviate 
ma~s misery. 
Until r.:cently Marxist theories of law were :v-irtually ignored in capitalist 
cnumrie~. Je~pite the fact that the writings of Marx aqd Engels contain some fertile 
tlhscrvati<>n~ nn law Y Furthermore Marxist theory generated a large number of 
n:~l'<trchcs. policies. and treatises on law. )f> and it influenced the legal orders of nations 
from the s(lViet J.!I!iO.l! atp Eastern Europe to Cuba and China . 
. ·\sa rt!sult ot'th~,..bi~ against seriously considering Marxism in studies of law and 
soc ic:t). mo~t rderences to Marxist theory grossly distort it. Dennis Lloyd. for 
..:xamplt:. :.~lthough recognizing Marxist theory as worthy of inclusion in the sociology 
of law. nonetheless distorts its perspective and claims. He asserts that for Marx the Jaw 
was merely an epiphenomenon reflecting the economic relations of capitalism.37 More 
rcc:..:nt \n,rks give a more sensitive and sophisticated rendering of Marxist contributions 
to law.-'~ It rests upon two pillars. Piers Beirne clearly articulated the first: "In the 
anal~ ,is of any phenomenon Marx always looked for the basic internal contradiction 
which determined the movement of the whole; ideological forms such as State. law, 
rei igiPn and so on are explained by reference to the contradictions of the capitalist 
mod.: nf pmduction. "3'~ 
The haste contradiction in capitalist societies rests upon the production of 
comnlllditic:- as a public event. Production requires everyone ·s labor. And we might 
add. ~c,..:ialist Ia"" (as in the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba) reflects contradictions of 
th.: ,{)(.·ialist mode of production (see Brady and Bahro). Only the capitalist, however, 
own!' the product. Only he decides how to dispose of the product. The legal order 
devdops in rc~ponse to the conflicts and inconsistencies of that system of produc-
tion: ..:alling slaves inhuman but relying on their human qualities; stigmatizing women 
as inferior hut depending on them for survival and tb,e maintenance of essential social 
relation~; dd1ning the talents of workers as less valuable than the talents of 
administraiOrs hut being onahle to produce a nail without the workers' labor. To 
legitimize the: inconsistencies and irrationalities born of the contradictions of the 
economy the legal order constitutes myths, creates institutions of repression, and tries 
to harmonize exploitation with freedom. expropriation with choice. inherently unequal 
contractual agrecmc.~ .,·ith an ideology of free will. So<.:ialist economic systems must 
harmonize the inefficiency of decentralized productive systems with a commitment to 
rapidly improving the standard of living of ··everyone" and industrializing tn 
competition with already industrialized capitalist countries. 
• 
• 
.: 
• 
j 
·J 
.. 
" 
·.-.'~.::;.e.·· 
-::k 
.. ' ~ ~y 
The second pillar of Marxist sociology of law consists of the Jiak.:tt<.:al 
relationship between scientific explanation and social praxis, the essen..:c 11f \br\i~: 
methodology. Ideas do not change by the force of their logic. New disco·;crics in sPci;.~l 
relationships and understanding society do not emerge merely from people ·s heaJs 
Reliable knowledge arises and can only arise in the course of people's efforts to change 
their world. Scientific socialism and reliable scientific knowledge about the processes 
and forces of history, then, come from our efforts to change the world in accordano.:e 
with the implications of our understanding (our theories) about that world . 
Thus Marxism diverged from consensus models both theoretically and 
methodologically. It diverged in its perception of both the appropriate vocabulary and 
the appropriate methodology of social inquiry, The vocabulary employs contradictimrs 
as the central analytical concept. The methodology rests upon the dialectical unity of 
theory and practice, thought and action, ends and means. To generate theory. engage in 
social practice; to produce good social practice. generate good theory. 
Marxism stresses that society constantly changes in a dialectical process. It ht1(d~ 
that the "ruling class" is neither unified nor omnipotent. Laws change as a 
consequence of the unending struggle between social classes and within social cla:sscs. 
The legal gains of the women's movement in the last hundred years, however slow. 
Marxism explains as process. The history of the struggle for equal rights for wt•mcn 
disproves both the consensus model and the Weberian theory that the law changes 
according to its own logic and ideological commitments. As Sachs and Wilson put it: 
A study of sexism in the legal systems ... explodes the notion that legal systems <:\·nh.:: 
according to inherent principles of logic and procedure. The great changes in gender status h;t' <: 
come about not through the harmonious unfolding from within of legal concepts. but throu!,!h 
vigorous attacks against the legal system from outside ... forced to a more egalitarian p<l,iti<~n 
by the challenge ... the record· shows each step forward has had to be strenuously campaigned 
for.-"' 
So also of improvements in workers • wages. work conditions. and child lahor. uf 
legally institutionalized racism, poverty, discrimination. and colonialism: they 
changed as the result not of the internal logic of the law. but of class conft i.:t. 
Marxist theory posits the salient role of struggle, contradiction. and conflict in the 
historical process as determinants of social and legal change. Other theories ignnre llr 
give little credence to the importance of this characteristic of human societies. Marx 
and Engels explained why legal forms took the shape they did. Marx wrote that "m) 
investigation led to the result that legal relations as well as forms of state are to he 
grasped neither from the so-called general development of the human mind. but rather 
have their roots in the material conditions of life. the sum total of which 
Hegel ... combines under the name of 'civil society.· " 41 
This reflected Marx's explanation for what later sociologists called ··culture.·· The 
economic system constitutes the base; the culture-law. political forms. ideologies. 
art-the superstructure. Engels wrote that ''according to the materialist concepti<'n nf 
:._,· 
- . ~ 
hi~tory. the ultimately determining element in history is the production and reproduc-/ 
tion of real life. " 42 • 
At tirst blush, Marxism seems only a special form of the sociological school. Law 
reinstitutionalizes the forms of society itself::with economic affairs as the key variable. 
Some Marxists so construed their doctrine'o':ii ·. · 
Engels himself denied so mechanical an interpretation of the base-superstructure 
metaphor. He wrote: 
If \<•m.:hody twists [the notion ,,f the primacy of the base) into saying that the economic element 
is rhe "'''-' determining one. he transform~ that proposition into a meaningless. senseless phrase. 
The econ<~rmc system is the basis. but the variou;'elements of the sup.:rstructure-political forms 
,,r the ..:las' struggle and its results, to wit: constitutions established by the victorious class after a 
suL·~·essful batt!..:. etc .. juridi~:al forms. and even reflexes of all these actual struggles in the brains 
nf th.: pani~:ipants. political. juristic philosophical theories. religious views and their further 
devd,~pment into systems of dogmas-also exercise their inftuence upon the course of the 
hi~torical struggles and in many cases predominate in determining their form.•·' 
The principle of the dialectic saved Marxist legal theory from economic determinism. 
Opposite~ interpenetrate each other. So do the base and the superstructure and even the 
different ekments of the superstructure itself. Law interacts not only with economic 
base. but with religion. philosophy, custom. tradition. and ideology. Law simulta-
neously affects and is affected by each of .these. 
Law can affect both the base and the superstructure because each of these 
inevitably contains contradictions and multifarious purposes and tendencies-in short, 
a potential for change. The law and the state can as it were nudge society along one or 
another of these alternative courses, although they cannot alone determine society's 
shape. 
These contradictory tendencies ultimately stem from the relationships of produc-
tion.-<a Classes arise in every society based upon private ownership of the means of 
production. The owners of property require workers to produce goods and profits. 
Capitalists ineluctably exploit their workers; their profits arise out of that exploitation. 
Capitalist society therefore inevitably produced classes with antagonistic interests. 
Since the base and its class struggle in a sense "cause" the superstructure, the 
culture reflects the class struggle itself. Law. as part of the superstructure, cannot avoid 
taking sides in the class struggle. It cannot become a neutral consensus of all-of-us, for 
a sncic::ty of antagonistic classes knows no consensus. The state becomes a weapon of a 
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G~ particular class. Law emanates from the state. Law in a society of cla~~cs mu~t 
therefore represent and advance the interests of one class or the other. 
"The nature of law is determined by economic relationships viu the political 
demands of the dominant class. ''47 Our legal order embodies not the rule of law. hut 
the rule of class struggle. In this respect. Marxism opposed most oth.:r schoob of 
jurisprudence. Marxism perceived societies everywhere in struggle and contlict. The 
state and law serve as weapons in that struggle. Most other schools and writt'r~ 
assumed a consensus-the common consciousness, the legal culture. custom. and so 
forth. Marx was right. As we argued in Chapter 2. all contemporary polities embody 
conflict. Law and the state inevitably represent one or another class in that contlict. The 
opposite proposition is simply false. Since many in the nonsocialist world regard the~c: 
as highly controversial statements. however, any theory of law and society must take 
them as problematic, not primitive propositions. 
The perception of the dialectical relationship between base and superstructure:. 
between economy and law, pointed toward the notion of law as a means of social 
engineering. "The legal superstructure ensures organization in social life. facilitate<; 
the conscious solution of the problems which confront it and enables members of th.: 
public to assimilate the principles and ideals of the future socialist community ... ,.x The 
existence of modem forces of production creates the possibility of a socialist and 
ultimately a communist order of society. ··But the transformation of possibility into 
reality is not automatic. A decisive role is played by ... the state. "4'~ 
The Marxist notion of the state and law therefore falls between the: pu~itivist and 
the sociological schools. For Hans Kelsen. a notable positivist. the state serves as "an 
immanent intelligence, directing social change. rather than as a social agency. ··<u The 
sociological school--or at least one branch of it-understands the state and law merely 
'as reflecting the customs and demands of "society." Marxism understands it as both 
simultaneously. Law reflects social organization. but at the same time and to a degree 
affirmatively directs its change. The dialectic embodies this perspective. 
·.~ 
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NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
1. \..tJhat advantages can you discern i.n 
3= 
G8> 
the base-superstructure 
metaphor that has dominated Marxist thinking about the law? It 
plainly arose as part of the struggle against capitalist 
governments, to explain why the law represented mainly the claims 
they need not ·,..egaYd the law, long pYeached as neuty-al, 
unbiassed and beyond reproach, even divinely 
oY"dained. Instead, it taught that the law itself served as a tool 
of the ~uling class in its efforts to oppress workers. What uses 
does a theory like that serve a socialist government in deciding 
CMarasinghe and Conklin, eds., 
1'384, PP· 22'3-253), Seidman suggested three advantages but a 
number of drawbacks: 
I. The teachings of the metaphor: (a) • The base-
supersty-ucture metaphor teaches that the base -- the mode of 
production -- sets limits on the choices that lawmakers can make. 
create a communist society; the level of 
development of the means of production does not yet permit that 
Unless a contradiction exist~ between the base and 
the superstructure change in either will •::oc cur only 
incrementally. A capitalist state structure with a capitalist 
mode of production and a ruling capitalist class will not likely 
conscic•usly and --purposely int·l"oduce institutional o·l" other 
changes apt to create a socialist economy. (c) A contradiction 
• 
• 
• 
• 
-:tc§_l 
and superstructure cannot lo:ong 
endure. Either the 
bet•,.,.een base 
base will change the superstructure, or 
the superstructure will 
change the basis. 
I I. Drawbacks of the metapho:•r. (a) The metaphor's langr.tage 
is misleading. It 
leads an ·unwary reader to believe that the 
base determines the supe-rstructure .-- a f•:•rmulation that Engels 
the metaphor might 
expressly denied. (b) The propositions that 
appear on so general a level 
gene-rate -- its th-ree teachings 
A theory that a practitioner 
as to lack any practical use. 
c anno:•t put to:• p-ractical 
use cannot serve as a theory to guide 
action. 
G. AN INSTITUTIONALIST VOCABULARY 
CHAMBLISS AND SEIDMAN, LAW, ORDER AND POWER CSUPRA) 
We have considered a wid · f . - - --- · · 
ways that the legal order a:dvs:~~ oin;e~~;~~~~ that scholars have urged determine rhe 
rather than analytical purpose y . . ~~ of these tum out to serve normative 
and legislative reasoning. So~e\!~:~~~:s~~~~~ ~~e~1 auton~mous legal syste_m. 
custom as determining law and the I al I s a e' sue as the Vo/ksgc'IST. 
. • eg cu ture. Others-the M · -
calhng attention to the im ortance of . . arxtst categones. 
law-in-books/law-in-actio: dichotomy powe~ 'b co~tradtctJon a~d the dialectic, and the 
in anaJysis. Alone, none of these th -urge y e legal reahsts-have greater utility 
study we have staked out. eones seems completely adequate for the domain of 
There is, however, a corpus of cate - hod - -
can be culled from the theories that we g:nes, met . olo~tes, and perspecnves which 
ta e as a startmg pomt for any adequate study . 
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Ml theories recognize that members of a group, collectivity, society, or nauon 
inherit patterns of social relations from their past. Furthermore it is generally 
acknowledged that those features of the past which are of paramount importance in 
shaping the present include the economic structure (e.g., capitalism, feudalism, 
s0cialismJ. political organization (e.g .. democratic, authoritarian, popular justice), and 
culture (e.g .. nonns, values. roles). In oth!=! words, all social theory recognizes that 
historically rooted institutions are fundamentally important influences over present-day 
event~. his also generally recognized as analytically useful to study both the material 
1 economic) and the ideulogic:al (cultural) conditions inherited from the past, an 
important quality of which are the extant contributions within and between material and 
ideological structures. 
Other ccmcepts employed by practically everyone who has studied the relation-
~hips between law and society incorporate a sociological vocabulary: role, position, 
nom1. institutions, power. cuntlict. interaction. We will discuss those various concepts 
in turn. 
Sociological inquiry often begins by describing people in terms of the positions 
they hold in society: Father. Mother. Sister. Judge, Professor, Derelict, Thief, 
LJthe-operator. Carpenter. Churchmember. Atheist, Political Activist, etc. The 
ol'>served regularities of the position, i.e., !~s content, arise because the persons who 
occupy it fulfill a complex of obligations an'd exercise a complex of rights associated 
with the position. These ··rights" and "obligations" may differ from the rights and 
obligati<'ns that lawyers customarily associate with the terms "right" and "duty," for 
most of them do not d1!'ive from the state's edict. One may have an "obligation" to 
sum.:nder his seat in a ~ to an elderly person, but in most places the state will not 
puni~h you if you do not. Hence, this "obligation" does not comprise a/ega/ duty. The 
complex of obligations that define a social position we denote collectively as its role 
and the equivalent complex of rights, its .flatus. 
These obligations and rights find their definition in prescriptive rules called norms. 
The~e have varying degrees of articulation. Relatively little precision defines the 
position of Father. although children may let their Father know unmistakably when he 
acts in a way that to them seems to viola'tl:, his role. (Act your age, Daddy!) Other 
nonns. such as some embodied in law, have highly explicit contents. 
Human societies exhibit a high degree of regularity of behaviors. We denote any 
regular behavior by people in various positions as an institution. A university in this 
view constitutes an institution because it consists of many people-administrators. 
students. teaching staff. clerks. secretaries, and many others-all behaving in 
parti~.:ular. repetitive pattcillS. 
Animal and insect societies, too, exhibit a high degree of regularity of behavior. 
Th~ human condition. however. differs from that of the lower orders. People have 
consciousness. with which they can create and shape their institutions, their material 
cnnditi<ms. and thci.- ulogy. The intricate interactions of an ant colony or a beehive, 
like those of a prairie dog village. rest mainly on the instinctive reactions of natural and 
~ocial stimuli. To. understand the structure of human societies, however. to explain 
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h~man b_ehavior, we must deal with the symbolic conscious forces that a~.:c~~\2:..~ 
human action. "Consciousness" and '"ideology." then. are concepts (catep)rie~ \ 
essential for our analysis. 
One can ask a wide range of questions about norms and social stru..:ture: wh;ll 
constitutes the content of the norms and how relevant do they seem to the ta~ks which 
people perform? To what extent are the norms institutionalized, that is. to what e1e.tent 
do the persons in the system accept the norms. treat them seriously. and expect the 
norms to guide the behavior of others? How are norms sanctioned? To what extent are 
they articulated? How closely does one's actions match the expectations of thnse 
concerned? To what extent do the consequences of compliance with the norm mat..:h 
the anticipations of the persons affected? 
As one consequence of the normative system. action manifests cons..:iousnes' anJ 
consciousness manifests action. Norms reflect the subjective. internal con..:cptions that 
human beings hold, about how people occupying ..:ertain positions ought to ~•<.:t. Th..:~ 
state the· role-expectation for the position. Role-performance refers to ho~ people in 
fact act. either in pursuit of the norms defining the position or. deviantly. in delian~·c nf 
the norms. 
The rules of law constitute a particular order of norms. Like all norms. they J..:tirh: 
how people or collectivities ought to act. Some. like the laws against murder. aJJre~" 
everyone. Some, like traffic laws. address only a particular category of (J\',rs, lrh 
(automobile drivers)~ ..Others aool~to verv .3leeific oositions I such as the laws that 
define the role of the LPrime Minister of ChinaJ. Still 
others address collectivities (corporation law). The commands 
of (the anti-pollution law address individual house holders, 
businessmen, public enterprises, private share corporation~. 
All constitute norms. 
They-also constitute laws. All the rules that laymen call "law"-statutes . ..:asc 
law, administrative regulation~onstitute norms. To understand how these function. 
we must understand three central ··taw-jobs": law creation, sanctions. and dispute-
settlement. In a centralized state, the state or its agencies create these norms. Ever:· 
society has as one of its law-jobs the creation of rules of law. the principal task llf 
legislatures, appellate courts, and administrative agencies . 
Second, besides understanding the creation of the norms and the determination of 
their content, we must also understand the enforcement of the norms-their a..:cnm-
panying sanctions. In a centralized state. state authority enforces most (but -not 
necessarily all) rules of law. If one violates a criminal law. the initiative of a sratt: 
official (the policeman or the prosecutor) sets the sanctioning system into m1ltion and 
other state officials (the jailer) actually inflict the punishment. If one violates ll!het 'llrt:. 
of law-e.g .• one forbidding negligent automobile driving--one may become liable 
for damag~s at _the behest of the injured party. who can enlist state power to enfor~·e the 
judgment . 
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• Thirdly, disputes arise concerning a variety of issues in connection with the 
normative system: the content of a norm or whether the person in question actually 
violated it. To resolve these conflicts, a dispute-settling machine emerges. All these 
various ··law-jobs .. constitute a set of processes: the processes of creating law. 
defining the content of the norms. administering the rules, settling disputes, sanction-
ing breach. For us. these processes constitute the legal order. Thus viewed, the legal 
order in a centralized state becomes more than a mere body of rules. Rather. it becomes 
a dynamic process involving every aspect of state action. for state action will involve at 
some point creation of a norm. adjudication about its content. administration. 
adjudication of violation. or sanctioning breach . 
The Legal Order and its Components 
Like every s.1cial subsystem, the legal order performs a myriad of functions; it resolves 
di~putes. ~.:rcates official norms. educates the people in certain value-sets. provides 
.:mployment fpr a professional class. etc. In studying so complex a system comprising 
q1 many functi<m!>, to what sorts of data ought one direct attention? What categories 
~hould we usc? Here we put forward a bare-bones outline of a model that we find 
useful. 
We ~tart frum the observable fact that people make certain demands upon the 
bureaucratic organization that constitutes the state. They demand that the state settle 
disputes. pcrf<mn certain services. redistribute resources, and make certain kinds of 
decisions. These demands lead either to the creation of new norms or to a change in the 
application of existing rules. Every norm. whether legal or nonlegal, aims at the 
activity of a role-occupant. With most norms, the sanction takes place through direct 
interaction between the person aggrieved by the breach of the norm in question and the 
role-occupant. If my children disobey me. my parental role authorizes me directly to 
punish them; if my employee displeases me, I can rebuke him or her or (in the absence 
of a union) discharge the said employee. 
A n:latively small group of norms, rather formal in character, have separate 
~anctioning institutions. Law constitutes the outstanding example. Other, law-like 
norms exist sanctioned by separate. although non-state bodies. As Hans Kelsen pointed 
out. practically every norm of law that addresses a role-occupant simultaneously 
commands that if the prosecutor proves to a judge that someone has committed murder, 
the judge shall apply a sanction. Thus the same demand by people that a rule-creating 
in!>titution formulate a new norm of conduct for a citizen simultaneously demands a 
new norm for the rule-sanctioning agencies, instructing them to impose a sanction if 
someone breaches the primary norm. Thus the safety at work laws which command 
employers to maintain safety standards simultaneously command judges in a proper 
case to order the employer to remedy unsafe conditions, subject to sanctions for 
cont.:mpt of court if the employer disobeys. 
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We can; therefore, very tentatively And very abstractly diagram. the rh>w a@! 
Jemands into the legal system. their conversion by rule-making and rule-sanctionin~ 
institutions into norms. addressed both to role-occupants and to the nde-sam:tioning 
agencies, and into sanctioning activity (see Fig. 3. 1). 
Every nonnative system induces or coerces activity. The normative system we 
have defined as the "legal order" uses state power to this end. Our model. therefore. 
suggests that demands come from various segments of the population and that the state 
through the legal order exercises its power to induce or coerce certain desired behavior 
by some set of role-occupants. In the nature of things, demands of this sort respond to 
the interest of those making the demands. They call for the exercise of state power to 
induce or coerce the desired activity because the law's addressees do not necessarily 
want so to act. The legal order, thus defined. becomes a system by which one part of 
the population uses state power to coerce another segment. It becomes a system for the 
exercise of state power. 
The diagram in Fig. 3.1 does not purport to provide a guide for investigations into 
the real world. It only traces the fiow of demands: demands put to the state by segments 
of the population, demands that rule-making institutions make upon role-occupants and 
upon role-sanctioning institutions. The sanctioning activity it refers to concerns the 
sanctioning activity the appropriate institution ought to apply. It tells us nothing about 
how in fact any of these various actors behave. It says nothing, for example, about who 
has the power to influence the state. 
Law cannot succeed in its ostensible purposes of affecting the behavior of its 
addressees unless lawmakers can predict accurately the actual behavior of a law's 
addressees in the face of the rule. The taw-in-action concerns behavior, what in fact 
takes place, not what ought to take place. How can we in general understand why 
people do or do not obey a rule of. law? To answer that question. what general 
categories of data ought we to examine? 
People in Demands 
social classes 
Rule-making 
institutions 
Figure H j(} ,J 
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·we .take as our most general mod~l ~f society people and collectivities mak~ 
choi~es among all the myriad forces of their social environment, in the light of what 
goes on inside their heads-i.e .. in the face of the ideological and material forces that 
make up their milieu. Every role-occupant makes an analogous choice when he obeys 
or disobeys a norm. Where the legal order defines the role, however, special forces 
exist that the law's addressee must take1nto account. First, the role-occupant must take 
into account the general res pee: or Qisrespect that .otiler,citizens ~ay acc;9nf oi>ed.ienc,. 
or disobt,ldience 10 !h.~ law 
People ~ho violate a law may lose respect and esteem from people 
who bell.eve that a moral imperative requires· obedience 
to law. More importantly, perhaps, where the law addresses a 
role, officials exist to adjudicate and enforce it. 
The role-occupant's arena of choice now includes among 
the faces that compose it the activity of officials. 
(A_ factory manager who permits his factory to pOllute the 
a~r must now take into account the possibility of administrative 
or judicial action.] 
We might diagram the relationships .thus presented as shown in Fig. 3.2. The 
cnti..::tl factors that a role-occupant must take into account in deciding how to behave 
~nn~i:.t nf the nom1 addressed to him, the expected activities of law-implementing 
agen..:ies and officials. and all the material and ideological factors that constitute his 
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aren~ ?f £hoic~. But, the lawmaking and the law-sanctioning agencies do not operaA @ 
a vacuum. They, too, consist of people-role-occupants-making choices within a 
. nlilieu of material and ideological forces, including rules of law defining their positions 
and the aCtivities of others. 
People do not remain passive in the face of undesirable material and ideological or 
legal conditions. They protest, they resist, they complain, they threaten. they rebd. 
they revolt. Throughout history, revolution, rebellion, and opposition to the e.\tant 
legal order occur everywhere. United States history is a catalog of constant rehellion. 
riot. revolution, and civil disorder. 52 Even our most heavily oppressed class. slaves in 
the antebellum South, revolted; more than four hundred black slave revolts took pla~·c 
before the Civil War.53 As a result, the law changed, sometimes slowly. as people won 
small gains from those in power, sometimes radically, as they succeeded in changing 
not only the people who operate the levers of state power, but the very structure of the 
state itself. The legal basis for a contract, for crime, for land ownership change!> 
radically in every country over the years. In our time, following revolutions. they 
changed radically in Algeria, Cuba, China, and the Soviet Union. Laws have no 
immortal existence. People make them, people change them. The operative mode by 
which the people bring this about we subsume under the word "feedback. .. This 
category, in tum. contains the idea of the dialectic. 
In what sense can we denote Fig. 3.2 a "model"? We earlier argued that no 
single, autonomous legal system exists discontinuous with society. A vast number of 
specific systems, involving particular laws, bureaucracies, and feedbacks, do exist. 
How do the model and its existential referents relate? . , 
Models organize thought. No matter how detailed, a physical model of an airplane 
only represents the airplane. It is not the airplane itself. A diagrammatic representation 
of the legal system affecting agriculture only represents that system. The model put 
forward here only represents the form of a variety of legal systems. lt directs attenti<m 
to particular categories of data for investigation, that is, it constitutes a heuristic. a 
perspective to guide discretionary choice in social inquiry. It is an agenda for research. 
In principle, one can test it, however, by seeing if there are instances in which 
significant variables not subsumed by the model do affect behavior in response to a rule 
of law. Testing will be facilitated, however, after closing the vague boxes labeled 
"arenas of choice." 
This model implies a definition of law that addresses law's function in channeling 
behavior. Law is a process by which government structures choice. Law as a device to 
structure choice e~presses at once law's usual marginality in influencing behavior and 
it'i importance as the principal instrument that government has to influence behavior. 
Since a people's history itself determines the arena of choice in most respects. that 
history determines the limits on law. We can understand law only by understanding it 
as part of a people's history and present conditions. 
The model assumes that society does not have a consensus. The arenas of choice 
of lawmakers, of law enforcers, and of the addressees of law do not necessarily have 
the same content. Lawmakers and some law enforcers come from or ha,·e du~c 
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allianCe' with the upper ranks of society. Some laws address their equals; most address 
"inemh<!r~ of society with v.:ry diffen:nt backgrounds. Mainly white male Congressmen 
wrote Title VII and in 1972 stretched it{p cover women academics. Mainly white male 
judg.:s enforce the law against mainiY''white male university administrators, at the 
behest of mainly white female claimants. The women claimants and the other actors 
plainly do not all have the same arenas of choice-i.e .. the same material, social and 
ideological ,:nvironments within which they choose and therefore act. 
:1.6 CO:"CLL:SIO~ 
Analyti.:al positivism asserted the independence 11f law from society. In response. 
so~.·iological jurisprudence and s\lme crude versil'ns of Marxist jurisprudence <.:!aimed 
that law \~as merely an epiphenomenon. Neither proposition matched reality. The legal 
order structurt!s society simultaneously with society's structuring of the legal order. 
The modd we have advanced purports to explicate this complex relationship. by 
examining how the various actions in the system behave and analyzing that behavior in 
terms of constrained choice. The constrli.ints that limit choice represent the influence of 
so~.·iety l'n the legal order; the fact of choice repres<::nts the legal order's potential for 
inlluencing society. 
The model depicts a deeply authoritarian legal order. where lawmakers promul-
gate law. enforcers implement it, and the rest of us respond to it. It assumes that the 
governors remain distinct from the masses of the people. That authoritarian structure. 
with its ,harp dichotomization between we and they, between the mass and the 
governors. li<::s at the heart of the felt deficiencies of the legal order. 
The model is admittedly ambiguous. The arrows that represent the arenas of 
L·hoice of the several actors are no more than signposts. So open a set of residual 
categories must render a model nonfalsifiable. All we hope to accomplish with the 
model is to provide a rudimentary vocabulary and the beginnings of a theory for 
studying ;.nd understanding law and society. 
The remainder of this book is an attempt to elaborate and complete the suggestions 
~·(•nwincd in this model. In the next chapter we look at the laws of contract and 
prupcrty. \Ve intend to d.:monstrate with this example how our historical-sociological 
nwdd helps us t<1 understand law and the legal order. In particular we intend to open up 
th:.~t pan 11f "ur pers!Xctivc which stresses the important role of power in social and 
k•gal r~latinn:-.hips. 
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NOTES AND QUESTIONS • 
1. Re c a 11 the Laws of Non-Transferability of Law and of the 
Rep·rodu c t ion of Institutions ( Chapte·r IV). As their principal 
te 11 us that to understand how law affects 
behaviour, we cannot look merely at the law. 
the rules of law encourages what some have called the "normative 
fallacy", the notion the behaviour that the la•,., says ought to 
take place in fact t·akes place. Rather than that, we. must 
understand that when people behave as they do in the face of a 
law, they may take the law into account, but they also take into 
account all the .:•ther constraints and resources of their 
environment. 
E~,:cept for analytical positivism, all the vc•cabularies that • 
we have considered accept this central proposition. They differ 
about what aspects of that non-legal environment affect behaviour 
sufficiently st·rongly to '"'arrant e~,;amina.tion. <That is, all these 
vocabularies serve only to guide research; they do not give 
answe·rs t•:• particular problems). "Legal culture" theo·rists fc•ct1s 
mainly on values and attitudes with respect ~o the legal order 
itself. Others in what we have (rather indiscriminately) gathered 
under the title of the "sc•ciol•:•gical school" l.:u:•k mc•re bro::oadly at 
the values and attitudes o::of the law's addressees -- that is, they 
focus on what go::oes on inside the addressees' heads. Law and 
Econo::omics focuses o::on people's pro::opensity to maximize their 
material wealth. Marxists focus on class interest. On what broa~ 
categories does institutionalist theory focus? • 
• 
• 
• 
2~ Professor MaYasinghe wrote of Seidman's Institutionalist 
theory that it appears to rely on law alone to implement the 
policies of development. the equation of development 
contains a heavy social element f•:•r which the law does not 
provide a complete answer. This appears a glaring weakness in 
Seidman's theory of 1 aw in devel r:•pment. " "Towa Yds a Third Wr:•r 1 d 
Pe·rspective r:•f Jurisprudence, in Marasinghe and Conklin, supra, 
p. 3"37. Do you agYee with Marasinghe's criticism? Does the 
Institutionalist theory take into account the "heavy social 
element" that Marasinghe mentions? Where does that "heavy s•:•cial 
ela111ent" appea·r in the diagram r:•f the legal r:•rder that states the 
essence of the Institutionalist vocabulary (figure 10. above)? 
D. V. Williams criticized institutionalist theory on the 
grc•und that it suggested that Third World policy-makers had a 
choice in determining their country's futures. In fact, he says, 
they had no ch•:•ice. Theil'" countries came into existence with 
col•:•nial-capitalist modes of ,productic•n. That mode of production 
demanded a neo-colonialist superstructure, and the Third World's 
rulers had no choice except to conform to the dictates of the 
world capitalist order. "The Authoritarianism of African Legal 
Orders: A Review and Critique of Robert B. Seidman's The State, 
Law and Development, 5 Contemporary Crises 255 (1980). Do you 
agree? Does China's experience refute Williams's argument? How 
would Seidman answer Williams's critique? 
4. Is the institutionalist vocabulary consistent with Marxism? 
= ~J. Cr:•nsider- the different vocabularies discussed in this 
s:.-@j·· 
Chapte·r. C.:•mpa·re and cont·rast the-!1;1_'!;\" _Which do:• you think will most 
likely produce research useful for China in its quest ior law 
sttitable fo·r social and political 
development? Why? 
6. The institutionalist model identifies three broad categories 
for investigation into questions of behaviour in the face of a 
1 aw: the rule itself; (2) the actual sanctions imposed, 
itself a function of the behaviour of the implementing agencies 
in the face o:•f a law; and (3) the "arena o:of choice" of the role 
occupant -- that is, the constraints and resources of the role-
occupant's social environment. In effect, the model tells us: 
Understand these three elements, and you can ·explain why_role 
O:•C c upants behave as they do in the face of a particular law •. If 
the issue between the various schools (soci•:•logi cal 1 la•..J and 
eccrnomi cs, etc. ) turns on what elements within the residuary 
category institutionalism calls "the arena of choice", does 
institutionalism as defined thus far help the researcher very 
- ~ 
much in determining where to focus research? The next Chapter 
purpr:•rts t•:• try to:• give s•:•me particular content to the crbiiego:•ry, 
"a·l'"ena of ch•:•i ce". 
• 
• 
• 
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